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The three essays herein explore social decision-making at various scopes and
for various ends.
At the biological level, substantial progress has been made at the neural
level in characterizing the dopaminergic and frontostriatal mechanisms me-
diating how we learn to adapt in such settings. Chapter 2 describes research
in which we combined computational modeling of strategic learning with a
pathway approach to characterize association of strategic behavior with vari-
ations in the dopamine pathway. Our findings highlight dissociable roles of
frontostriatal systems in strategic learning and support the notion that ge-
netic variation, organized along specific pathways, forms an important source
of variation in complex phenotypes such as strategic behavior.
Even crudely biased information may be persuasive when people are not
fully rational. For Chapter 3, using novel sender-receiver experiments, I eval-
uate 78 individuals’ cognitive susceptibility to persuasion by comparing the
relative influences of truthful strategic and non-strategic signals. The main
finding is that people underestimate and undercorrect for bias. Consistent
with an anchor-and-adjust heuristic, higher cognitive cost negatively affects
the size of bias correction.
Finally, for the research in Chapter 4 I studied the role of social preferences
in inciting collusion by asking 282 online participants how they might behave
in a sequential game of chance (a hidden die game) with hypothetical partners
and possible cheating. Extending previous findings, I found evidence of types
that are predicted by a measure of social preferences. Many people are willing
to collude, given the chance. Some always refuse, even disrupting attempts
at collusion. And a sizable middle are honest when only one other person
colludes, but dishonest when two other people collude prior to the subject.
This last group tend to prefer more altruistic options in a dictator game.
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The vibrant study of behavior afforded to social scientists by the tools offered
by economics is occasionally inconvenienced by the fact that people often do
not behave as traditional theory prescribes. Models of pure rationality and
enlightened self-interest, despite serving as a powerful and convenient sim-
plifying assumptions, have been enriched by contributions from behavioral
economics (Camerer, 2003; Camerer et al., 2011). Still, despite the increased
attention that behavioral economics has received in the past ten years, a
general theory of boundedly rational behavior is still far away, if one is in
view at all, and it yet remains imperative to study decision-making by having
people make decisions in relevant contexts.
In the tradition of behavioral economics, I explore in the chapters that
follow three distinct aspects of individual decision-making, each emphasiz-
ing activity at different scales. In Chapter 2 I describe joint research I did
with the Neuroeconomics Lab at University of California at Berkeley and
the B2ESS laboratory at the National University of Singapore that connects
factors at the biological scale to individual behavior, in this case learning in
a competitive environment. In Chapter 3, I lend my attention to a problem
of individual cognition, namely the challenge of interpreting biased infor-
mation, as when deciding which candidate deserves one’s vote. Finally, in
Chapter 4 I look at factors influencing a person’s willingness to collude in an
unethical activity (lying), with an eye towards understanding corruption in
organizations. Together, I hope that these studies both highlight outstand-
ing questions about human behavior and, hopefully, cast some dim light on
potential ways forward.
These papers, besides being a reflection of my own tastes, are united by
the suggestion, or perhaps gentle reminder, that people are vulnerable in our
ever-complex social environment. In economic terms, the biological mecha-
nisms we study that influence competitive strategic interaction are ancient,
1
yet they appear to induce heterogeneity in how effectively people adapt to
the world today. Though we might recognize bias in the information we re-
ceive, subjects in my study under-compensate for the slant, suggesting that
we are prone to persuasion even while believing ourselves sophisticated and
immune. The results from my study of collusion suggest, admittedly tenta-
tively, that even our better angels, which might otherwise steer us to care for
and about others, could be turned towards corruption with the appropriate
nudges.
Most projects have its own unique challenges or features worth extra atten-
tion to other practitioners, and these are no exception. Methodologically, the
research herein relies firmly on the innovations of experimental economists
Smith (1976); Davis and Holt (1993). While no technique or design is particu-
larly groundbreaking, I hope that there may be some strategies of interest in,
for example, controlling for nonstandard risk preferences and sophisticated
agents in the Campaign Game of Chapter 3, in the utility of unincentivized
thought experiments, even in a study of lying, as demonstrated in Chapter 4,
or in the technical details of incorporating genetic data into economic models
of learning.
For the reader’s convenience, I provide a very brief summary about the
contents of the main remaining chapters in the sections that follow.
Learning: Dissociable Contribution of Prefrontal and Striatal
Dopaminergic Genes to Learning in Economic Games
Chapter 2 looks at the connections between a set of genes encoding dopamine
function in the brain and how people learn in a simple competitive game,
building off a number of developments across several domains. Applications
of functional neuroimaging, combined with formal mathematical models of
behavior, provided links between specific structures in the brain, notably
the prefrontal cortex and striatum, and models of learning that incorporate
higher-order inferences about opponents’ behavior (Zhu et al., 2012; Hamp-
ton et al., 2008; Camerer and Ho, 1999). Likewise, a wealth of genetic data,
and growing knowledge about how genes influence neurotransmitters in the
brain, made it possible to perform a targeted search for the subtle manipu-
lation of behavior due to genes.
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Using a variation on the all-pay auction called the patent race to study
how 207 subjects varied their decision-making processes, we compared the
behavioral variation to differences in the set of genes that carry out biological
functions required for dopaminergic functioning, including the production of
dopamine, the sensitivity of neurons to dopamine, and the termination of the
dopamine transmission through the clearance of the synaptic cleft. Individ-
ual variation in these genes were efficiently represented based on principal
components and actual behavior was compared to predictions of a computa-
tional learning model enriched with these genetic representations.
We found that genes differentially expressed in separate brain regions
influenced distinct components of people’s decision-making processes, and
a surprising degree of consistency with what is known at the brain level
about how people make decisions in social interactions. Specifically, we
found that variation in genes that primarily regulate prefrontal dopamine
clearance—catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) and two isoforms of
monoamine oxidase—modulated degree to which higher-order inferences in-
fluenced learning across individuals. In contrast, we did not find significant
association for other genes in the dopamine pathway. Furthermore, varia-
tion in genes that primarily regulate striatal dopamine function—dopamine
transporter and D2 receptors—was significantly associated with the learning
rate. We found that this was also the case with COMT, but not for other
dopaminergic genes. These results add to growing evidence that dopamine
mechanisms critically underlie a wide class of value-based decision making
across both social and nonsocial settings (O’Connell and Hofmann, 2012).
Persuasion: Laboratory Evidence of Cognitive Limits When
Updating on Biased Information
People are not perfectly rational, but there is heterogeneity in just how much
we deviate from this ideal, both across individuals and even within ourselves.
For some, it may be that processing new information before morning coffee
is not the same as doing so three hours later. Thinking, after all, takes
effort (Kahneman, 2011). Likewise, the distribution of information is hetero-
geneous, and those with the most important information will often not be
neutral with regards to how such information is used, as it is in the case of
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firms and advertising.
The observation that motivates Chapter 3 is that the advantage of asym-
metric information is often accompanied by an imbalance in resources and
motivation. Such advantages, especially in human capital, can confer a cogni-
tive advantage to the firms, propagandist, or politician. In short, asymmetry
in both information and cognitive abilities (with respect to rationality) is
not unusual. For the advantaged firms, political candidates, lawyers, lob-
byists, or other organizations whose business is persuasion, the opportunity
to exploit may be considerable. In a complex social environment with echo
chambers and filter bubbles, are we cognitively able to compensate for bias?
What strategies are we using to overcome it? Is this exploitable by ’bad
actors’?
Using a laboratory experiment that put 78 subjects in the position of an
influential voter, I conclude that no, we are not able to compensate for even
simple selection bias, though we may recognize it, and yes, it is exploitable.
In the experiment, subjects received information from one candidate and
had to decide which one to vote for. The candidate players, however, could
decide which one of two bits of information to reveal to the voter. Though
this information was true, it was also selective. This sender-receiver game,
based on a model of negative campaigning formulated and analyzed in Pol-
born and Yi (2006), describes a situation in which information can easily
be verified, but not efficiently uncovered by the voter/consumer/agent. The
design intentionally simplifies the job of the candidates (also subjects), who
easily choose the optimal strategy of revealing the information that makes
them look relatively best.
The rational strategy requires that subjects deduce not only that the infor-
mation revealed should be the most flattering, but also to make a somewhat
nuanced correction in evaluating the information presented. At the simplest,
rationality predicts that a candidate with nothing positive to say about them-
selves should be judged doubly poor, as it implies that they have little bad
to say about their opponent. In fact, subjects made only a simple correction,
consistent with the ’anchor-and-adjust’ heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974), that systematically underestimated the importance of bias. Conse-
quently, they tended to ’vote’ for the candidate whose information they
received, 59.4% to 37.3% (with some abstentions), instead of evenly as a
rational voter would. Reminding subjects of the bias did not improve per-
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formance. Even in this idealized world, with clear rules, truthful (if biased)
signals, and no appeals to emotion, having control of the information pro-
vided a measurable advantage and confirming a clear channel for exploitation
by well-funded bad actors.
Collusion: A Prosocial Activity
Chapter 4 is motivated by questions about the corruptibility of private virtue
and the implications for larger systems. In contrast to the narrowly selfish
model of human behavior frequently applied in economics, altruism—caring
about those other than ourselves—and the tendency for cooperation is a
robust finding in behavioral economics that has been conjectured as serving
an evolutionary role in ensuring the survival of primitive humans (Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Nowak, 2006). Recent research has found a dark side
to our collaborative nature, however, with unethical behavior escalating in
a collaborative laboratory experiment compared to the individual control
(Weisel and Shalvi, 2015).
Recruiting through the online website Mechanical Turk, I had 282 US-
based subjects respond to one of seven thought experiments. In each they
were asked to decide whether they would lie (misreporting a private roll of a
die) in order to ensure a certain financial outcome for themselves and, some-
times, other people. In laboratory variations of this experiment, a significant
portion (around 30% to half) are honest, but if players’ payoffs were inter-
dependent, as in a team, then cheating increased (Weisel and Shalvi, 2015;
Conrads et al., 2013). However, the reason for the increase is not clear. In my
experiment I had subjects consider a sequential version, with other players
reporting suspiciously high rolls before.
What I found was that aggregate cheating was not responsive to changes
in the consequences of others, which I interpret as suggesting that others’
wellbeing does not factor highly in cheaters’ decision to cheat. However, as
in laboratory experiments, about half the respondents refused to lie. They
did not outright stymie the lie, as a small fraction of subjects did by mis-
reporting a disadvantageous result (which I call a moral lie), but they did
not take advantage of the situation to guarantee a higher payoff. An anal-
ysis of individual preferences found that cheaters were self-interested, while
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non-cheaters were more altruistic. The aggregate level of cheating seems not
to respond to how others are affected because those most likely to care are
also least likely to cheat.
Except, it turns out, when more people are colluding. In a slightly larger
group of three, with two people reporting suspiciously advantageous results,
now both altruistic and self-interested subjects were in agreement—cheating
was preferred. This simple change, which when contrasted with a similar
treatment with three beneficiaries but fewer needed cheaters showed signifi-
cantly higher levels of collusion (around 72%). The results definitely depend
on the sequence, as far fewer people chose similarly when they had to report
before the others.
Previous research found three types in individual play, those that will al-
ways be honest, opportunists that were happy to take maximum advantage,
and a middle ground that lied, but not to maximum effect (Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009). My results, while tentative,
provide evidence of types that are predicted by a measure of social prefer-
ences. As in earlier studies, many people are fine cheating, given the chance.
Others refused to, even disrupting attempts at collusion. And a sizable mid-
dle would be honest, but only until another person cheats as well, with all
that implies.
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Chapter 2
Learning: Dissociable Contribution of
Prefrontal and Striatal Dopaminergic Genes to
Learning in Economic Games
Game theory describes strategic interactions where success of players’ actions
depends on those of co-players and has been instrumental in the quantitative
analysis of social behavior (Camerer, 2011; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).1
2 In humans, there is substantial evidence from laboratory experiments
that, in addition to learning about rewards and punishments available in
the environment, people also anticipate and respond to competitive or co-
operative actions of other participants (Camerer, 2011; Rangel et al., 2008).
Specifically, learning in strategic settings can be parsimoniously character-
ized using two learning rules across a wide range of strategic contexts and
experimental conditions: (i) reinforcement-based learning (RL) through trial
and error and (ii) belief-based learning through anticipating and responding
to the actions of others (Camerer, 2011; Camerer and Ho, 1999).
Only in the past decade, however, have researchers begun to characterize
the biological substrates underlying decision making in game theoretic set-
tings (Rangel et al., 2008). At the neural level, applications of functional
neuroimaging, combined with formal mathematical models of behavior, have
elucidated key roles of the frontostriatal circuits and putative dopaminer-
gic mechanisms in guiding social behavior (Zhu et al., 2012; Behrens et al.,
2008). In particular, during competitive strategic interactions activity in the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) was found to be better accounted for by models
1This chapter contains previously published material, for which the copyright owner
has provided permission to reprint. The original article should be cited as follows:
Set, Eric, Ignacio Saez, Lusha Zhu, Daniel E Houser, Noah Myung, Songfa Zhong,
Richard P Ebstein, Soo Hong Chew, and Ming Hsu (2014) “Dissociable Contribution of
Prefrontal and Striatal Dopaminergic Genes to Learning in Economic Games,” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 111, No. 26, pp. 9615–9620.
2Author contributions: E.S., L.Z., S.Z., and M.H. designed research; E.S. performed
research; E.S. and M.H. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; E.S., I.S., D.E.H., and
M.H. analyzed data; and E.S., I.S., L.Z., D.E.H., N.M., S.Z., R.P.E., S.H.C., and M.H.
wrote the paper.
9
that incorporate higher-order inferences about opponents’ behavior, rather
than simpler forms of trial-and-error reinforcement learning (Zhu et al., 2012;
Hampton et al., 2008).
In comparison, despite the explosion in availability of genomic data as
well as known heritability of economic behavior, we know much less about
the molecular genetic underpinnings of the intermediate neural mechanisms
(Ebstein et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2005). Here we sought to shed light
on the neurogenetic basis of strategic behavior by exploiting known variation
in the set of genes within the dopamine pathway and studying their effects
on behavior. A genetic pathway consists of a group of functionally related
genes that mediate a particular biological process (e.g., dopamine function-
ing) (Fig. 2.1B) (Wang et al., 2010). For example, the DAT1 gene encodes
the dopamine transporter (DAT), whose function is to remove dopamine from
the synaptic cleft, thus terminating the signal of the neurotransmitter. Al-
though these pathways are abstractions of complex biological processes that
have no simple start or end points, they have been invaluable to researchers
because they capture and organize our knowledge in a parsimonious and
tractable manner (Wang et al., 2010).
Studying the molecular basis of social and strategic behavior in the con-
text of economic games and specific biological pathways offers a number of
important advantages. First, the dopamine pathway seems to play a funda-
mental role in social behavior in all known vertebrate species by virtue of
its involvement in (social) reward and decision-making processes (O’Connell
and Hofmann, 2012; Schultz et al., 1997). Unlike economic phenotypes such
as wealth that are far removed from the proximate biological mechanisms,
models of strategic learning provide highly parsimonious and mathematically
rigorous descriptions of behavior and have been shown to have substantial
predictive validity at both behavioral and neural levels (Rangel et al., 2008;
Robinson et al., 2005).
Importantly, focusing on specific biological pathways allows us to exploit
existing knowledge regarding the biological mechanisms underlying behavior,
and in particular known relationships between gene and brain. The dopamine
system is known to exhibit remarkable regional variation in expression levels
of genes coding for the set of enzymes, receptors, and transporters involved
in dopamine functioning (Fig. 2.1C) (O’Connell and Hofmann, 2012; Pierce
and Kumaresan, 2006). In the PFC, where DAT1 expression is low, genes
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Figure 2.1: (A) Starting with the Kyoto Encyclopedia of Genes and
Genomes dopamine pathway, we selected a set of genes directly related to
dopamine functioning (Table 2.1). For each gene, we took all available
SNPs in the GWA dataset and conducted PCA to account for correlation
due to LD. On the phenotype side, we used a laboratory-based economic
game (patent race). These were then combined in our computational model,
where parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood. Hypothesis
testing was done using two different methods: (i) permutation p-values
under the null hypothesis of no association and (ii) empirical p-values by
comparing to randomly matched genes in the GWA dataset. (B) Dopamine
pathway genes are represented in a stylized version of the dopamine
synapse and include dopamine genes directly involved in synthesis (green),
uptake (blue), and metabolism (pink) and receptors (violet). Certain
details, such as presynaptic autoreceptors, have been omitted for clarity.
(C) In the patent race, subjects were presented with (i) the game with
information regarding their endowment, the endowment of the opponent,
and the potential prize. (ii) Subjects inputted the decision (self-paced) by
pressing a button mapped to the desired investment amount from the
initial endowment. (iii) After a brief delay, the opponent’s choice was
revealed. If the subject’s investment was strictly more than those of the
opponent, the subject won the prize; otherwise, the subject lost the prize.
In either case, the subject kept the portion of the endowment not invested.
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regulating enzymatic breakdown, in particular catechol-O-methyl transferase
(COMT) and to a lesser extent isoforms of the monoamine oxidase (MAO)
genes, are important determinants of dopamine flux (Nemoda et al., 2011).
In contrast, these genes have much less impact on striatal dopamine levels,
where DAT1 expression is high (Frank et al., 2009). On the receptor side, re-
gional variation results from distribution of dopamine receptor types (Cortés
et al., 1989). Receptors of the D1 family, D1 and D5, are expressed through-
out the brain. In contrast, receptors in the D2 family exhibit more regional
specificity: D2 receptors are expressed primarily in the dorsal striatum, D3
receptors in the ventral striatum, including nucleus accumbens but less so
in dorsal striatum, and D4 receptors in the frontal cortex and limbic regions
(Cortés et al., 1989).
These differences have known important consequences for cognition and
behavior (Nemoda et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2009) but to our knowledge
have not been explored in strategic or social behavior in humans. Here
we studied the behavior of 218 participants in a multistrategy competitive
game, the so-called patent race, in a stylized but well-characterized setting of
a population with many anonymously interacting agents and low probability
of re-encounter (Fig. 2.1C and SI Materials and Methods) (Zhu et al., 2012).
Moreover, using this game, previous neuroimaging results have been able
to disaggregate trial-by-trial variation in neural responses along frontostriatal
circuits to distinct computational signatures of RL and belief learning pro-
cesses (Zhu et al., 2012). In particular, whereas the medial PFC was found to
respond selectively to belief-based inputs and reflected individual differences
in degree of engagement of belief learning, striatal activity was correlated
with both reinforcement and belief-based signals, suggesting possible con-
vergence of these signals in the striatum (Zhu et al., 2012). Building upon
these findings, therefore, we investigated (i) the degree to which variation
in strategic learning can be captured by variation in genes in the dopamine
pathway and (ii) the extent to which these variations are organized along
dissociable prefrontal and striatal neural systems.
Consistent with our goal of capturing overall variation in dopamine func-
tioning and its effects on strategic learning, we included not only exonic
polymorphisms that exert direct effects on protein sequence and functions
but also those in intronic and UTRs, as well as variable-number tandem re-
peats (VNTRs) and synonymous exonic polymorphisms (Fig. 2.1B and SI
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Materials and Methods). Although long thought to have no biological effect,
intronic and synonymous mutations are now known to affect gene transla-
tional and transcriptional efficiencies, and consequently protein levels, as op-
posed to altering protein structure itself (Sauna and Kimchi-Sarfaty, 2011).
To account for correlated regressors owing to linkage disequilibrium (LD), we
took a dimension reduction approach and created a set of eigenSNPs using
principal components analysis (PCA) (Fig. 2.1B and Materials and Meth-
ods). Compared with traditional candidate gene approaches, this multilocus
approach can be used to detect association between a phenotype and groups
of SNPs (genes) and is more efficient when there exist weaker but coordinated
effects arising from multiple SNP markers (Wang et al., 2010).
Results
Model-Based Characterization of Behavior.
To characterize individual variation in choice behavior, we adopted a hybrid
model—experience weighted attraction (EWA)—that combines and nests
both reinforcement and belief learning (Camerer, 2011; Camerer and Ho,
1999). Specifically, choice behavior in EWA is governed by two key parame-
ters capturing distinct computational components involved in updating play-
ers’ action values and has been highly successful in explaining observations
across a wide range of games at both behavioral and neural levels (Materials
and Methods, Fig. A.1, and Table A.1). First, the belief learning parameter
δ captures a player’s sensitivity toward actions of opponents as opposed to
received payoffs. An individual responding only to received payoffs is cap-
tured by δ = 0, corresponding to a pure RL player, whereas a player driven
entirely by belief learning is captured by δ = 1. Using choice behavior and
simulations for a single subject as illustration (Fig. 2.2A, Upper), a larger
belief learning parameter is most saliently reflected in an increased proba-
bility of investing 2 and 3 in rounds 70–100, corresponding to periods when
strong players invested 1–2 units with increased likelihood. Second, learning
rate ρ governs how action values depreciate over time, capturing the degree
to which players are sensitive to more recent observations relative to past
ones. A player highly sensitive to recent observations, captured by a low ρ,
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will therefore adapt faster, for example during rounds 80–100 in Fig. 2.2A,
Lower, whereas a player with a large ρ is similarly sensitive to recent and
past observations and adapts more slowly.
Consistent with previous studies of strategic learning (Camerer and Ho,
1999; Zhu et al., 2012), we found that the hybrid model significantly outper-
formed both reinforcement and belief-based learning models alone as mea-
sured using the likelihood ratio test (p < 0.001 for each) as well as the Akaike
information criterion penalizing for number of parameters (p < 0.001 for
each). To capture individual variation in behavior, we estimated a saturated
(fixed effects) model where each participant was coded with individual belief
learning and learning rate parameters, δSi (mean = 0.36, SD = 0.17) and ρ
S
i
(mean = 0.86, SD = 0.10), respectively (Fig. 2.2B). This generated a set of
individual-level belief learning parameters that we use in subsequent genetic
analyses. Furthermore, we found that the individual estimates of the two
parameters were largely uncorrelated (Spearman ρ = 0.13), which allowed us
to characterize potential separable genetic contributions to behavior.
Characterization of Genetic Variation in Dopamine Pathway.
We next sought to summarize variation of genes along the dopamine path-
way. Using PCA and a 90% cutoff rule (Materials and Methods), we found
SNPs within gene were highly correlated, consistent with nearby markers
being in strong LD (Table 2.1). For example, four eigenSNPs contained
91% of the variation in the COMT gene, for which our genome-wide associa-
tion (GWA) data contained 17 SNPs that exceeded a minor allele frequency
(MAF) threshold of 0.1 (Table 2.1). Critically for our goal of identifying con-
tribution of individual dopamine genes to behavior, we found using canonical
correlation analysis that variation across genes are essentially uncorrelated















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Prefrontal Dopamine Genes Selectively Contribute to Variation
in Belief Learning.
Having summarized overall variation at both behavioral and genetic levels,
we sought to identify genetic contributions to individual variation in the de-
gree of belief learning, captured by the parameter δ. Specifically, for each
gene in the dopamine pathway, we allowed the δ parameter in our computa-
tional model to vary according to the set of associated eigenSNPs, which can
be interpreted as genetic variation that affects neural sensitivity to specific
reward-related inputs (Materials and Methods). For example, in the case of
the MAOB gene, in addition to the population parameter δ we included three
additional parameters, {δE1, δE2, δE3}, corresponding to the three eigenSNPs
of the MAOB gene (Table 2.1 and SI Materials and Methods). Motivated
by our previous neuroimaging findings suggesting PFC involvement in be-
lief learning (Zhu et al., 2012), we first examined genes known to regulate
prefrontal dopamine levels. Specifically, we included the COMT gene and
the two monoamine oxidase genes (MAO A and B) that code for isoforms
of enzymes that break down extracellular dopamine. Functionally, MAOB is
known to preferentially metabolize dopamine, whereas MAOA is more selec-
tive toward serotonin (Shih et al., 1999). Animal experiments using COMT
knock-out mice suggest that MAO contributed to 20% of dopamine degra-
dation, approximately half that of COMT (Shih et al., 1999).
Using permutation tests to assess the null hypothesis of no association,
we found that allowing belief learning to vary according to COMT genotype
significantly improved model fit (permutation p < 0.005, Table 2.1). In ad-
dition, and consistent with animal data on relative efficiency of the different
enzymes in dopamine breakdown, we found that MAOB exerted a significant
(permutation p < 0.05) albeit weaker influence on belief learning in terms
of both significance as well as improvement in log likelihood (Table 2.1 and
Materials and Methods). For MAOA, which has greater affinity to serotonin
compared with dopamine (Shih et al., 1999), we found an even weaker as-
sociation (permutation p < 0.1; Table 2.1). Interestingly, incorporating the
30-base repeat sequence VNTR, a highly studied polymorphism in the pro-
moter region that has been implicated in behavioral traits such as aggression
(Buckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008), together with SNP data signifi-
cantly improved the model (permutation p < 0.05; Table 2.1). We then
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characterized genes that primarily modulated striatal genes, as well as other
genes in our dopamine pathway, including receptors and those involved in
dopamine synthesis. In contrast, we did not find any of these to significantly
improve model fit (minimum permutation p < 0.30; Table 2.1).
Multiplexed Contribution of Dopamine Genes to Variation in
Learning Rate.
Next, we characterized genes that explained the other key parameter of our
computational model—the learning rate ρ. As with the belief learning param-
eter, we allowed ρ to vary according the set of eigenSNPs in each dopamine
gene. Motivated by our hypothesis that learning rate is primarily regulated
by striatal functioning, we first characterized dopamine genes that dispro-
portionately affected striatal dopamine functioning, in particular DAT1, and
also dopamine receptor (DR) D2 and DRD3 (Gainetdinov and Caron, 2003;
Missale et al., 1998). We found that the DAT1 gene was significantly associ-
ated with variation in individual learning rates (permutation p < 0.05; Table
2.1). The existence of association is further enhanced by the fact that the
DAT1 VNTR was also significantly associated with ρ (permutation p < 0.01;
Table 2.1), as well as being jointly significant (permutation p < 0.02; Table
2.1).
Next we characterized dopamine receptor genes DRD2 and DRD3, which
primarily affect dorsal and ventral striatal dopamine functioning, respec-
tively. In previous neuroimaging results, activity in the dorsal striatum, in
particular the putamen, but not the ventral striatum, was correlated with
both reinforcement and belief prediction errors. However, there are reasons
to suspect that the ventral striatum may also be involved, because it is
widely implicated in neuroimaging studies on reward and decision making
(Montague et al., 2006). We found that DRD2 was significantly associated
with the learning rate (permutation p < 0.05), but not DRD3 (permutation
p > 0.2; Table 2.1).
We then characterized genes that primarily affect prefrontal dopamine
functioning. However, there are studies that suggest COMT exerts an indi-
rect effect on striatal dopamine (Dreher et al., 2009; Yacubian et al., 2007).
In contrast, we are not aware of human or animal studies demonstrating such
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indirect effects for MAO. Intriguingly, we found that COMT variation was
significantly associated with the learning rate (p < 0.05), but not for either
MAOA or MAOB (p > 0.5 for each; Table 2.1). Finally, we characterized
dopamine synthesis genes as well as receptor genes that do not exhibit re-
gional specificity and did not find that these genes are significantly associated
with behavior (minimum p = 0.19; Table 2.1).
Distribution of Association Across the Genome.
In the above results we have focused on permutation tests to guard against
spurious associations compared with a random genotype. It is possible, how-
ever, that our evidence of association does not rise above the background
association compared with the genome at large. To investigate this possibil-
ity, we compared the fit of models using dopamine genes relative to matching
non-dopamine genes in the GWA dataset to generate an “empirical” null dis-
tribution (SI Materials and Methods). Strikingly, despite varying sizes of the
comparison gene sets (Table A.3), we found that the empirical null distribu-
tions, and consequently p-values, tracked the permutation null closely in all
dopamine genes tested (Table 2.1).
In addition, to formally compare effect size of prefrontal and striatal
dopamine genes on choice behavior, we contrasted, using a bootstrap proce-
dure, the mean eigenSNPs coefficient for COMT and MAOB against those
for DAT1 and DRD2 (SI Materials and Methods). We found a strong dissoci-
ation between the two gene sets in the belief learning parameter δ, such that
prefrontal genes exerted a significantly greater effect than striatal dopamine
genes (bootstrap p = .004). In contrast, likely owing to the significant con-
tribution of COMT to learning rate, we only found a weak dissociation in
favor of striatal genes for the ρ parameter (bootstrap p = .097).
Mapping Genetic Variation to Behavioral Variation.
Here we performed two types of model checks to illustrate how estimated ge-
netic effects captured variation at the level of model parameters and choice
behavior. First, to illustrate estimated genetic contribution to variation in
the belief learning parameter δ, we imputed, for each individual, a gene-
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weighted parameter estimates δGi by multiplying δEj estimates with individ-
ual eigenSNP scores (SI Materials and Methods). Using these imputed pa-
rameters, we found that the variation in δGi consistently reflected individual
differences summarized by δSi from the saturated model using fixed effects
(Fig. 2.3B). For example, for the COMT gene, we found that the lowest
quartile of δGi estimates corresponded to a mean δ
S
i value of 0.26, compared
with 0.45 for the highest quartile. Using the same procedure for the learning
rate parameter ρ, we found a similar relationship with the gene-weighted pa-
rameter estimates ρGi . For the DAT1 gene, for example, the lowest quartile
of ρGi estimates corresponded to a mean ρ
S
i value of 0.81, compared with 0.89
for the highest quartile (Fig. 2.4B).
Next, we sought to quantify and visualize estimated genetic effects at the
choice behavior level. First, as shown in previous theoretical and behavioral
studies (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Zhu et al., 2012), a key feature distinguishing
belief and reinforcement learning is an increased rate of switching strategies
across rounds by belief learners, owing to sensitivity of belief learners to the
action of opponents (Zhu et al., 2012). Consistent with this model predic-
tion, we found that individuals with higher δGi values indeed exhibited higher
switching rates compared with those with lower values (Fig. 2.3C). Second,
we sought to capture the influence of learning rate on choice behavior. Un-
der EWA, individuals with lower ρGi values should be influenced by more
recent outcomes compared with those with higher values (Camerer and Ho,
1999; Zhu et al., 2012). We therefore calculated a correlogram to measure
how investment levels were influenced by payoff information at different lags
(Fig. 2.4C). Consistent with model predictions, we found that for high ρGi
individuals past experiences continue to exert an effect well into 20 rounds in
to the future, whereas for low ρGi individuals this effect drops sharply after
10 rounds (Fig. 2.4C).
Distribution of Association Across SNPs.
Next we sought to understand how identified behavioral effects are dis-
tributed across SNPs. Of SNPs in dopamine genes with a significant as-
sociation with behavioral parameters, only one is associated with changes
in protein sequence: rs4680 (Val158Met) in COMT, a polymorphism that
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Figure 2.3: (A) Permutation tests showed significant association of COMT
and MAOB with individual variation in belief learning (p < 0.005 and
p < 0.05, respectively), whereas MAOA was marginally significant
(p < 0.1). No other genes were found to be significantly associated.
Lengths of bars indicate likelihood improvement per principal component.
Colors represent permutation p-values. (B) To capture how genetic
variation affects the degree of belief learning, we split, for each gene, the
gene-weighted δGi values into quartiles (terciles in the case of MAOA owing
to limited genetic variation) and calculated the mean individual-level δFi
values (error bars are SEM). The former was calculated using the calibrated
eigenSNP model, whereas the latter was estimated using fixed effects in a
saturated model. (C) Effects of gene variation on switching rate were
calculated as the probability that participants switched investment amounts
between trials t and t+ 1, separated by the imputed gene-weighted learning
parameter δGi .Consistent with model predictions, individuals with higher δ
G
i
values switched at a higher rate than those with lower values. (D)
Individual SNP associations for belief learning parameter δ are shown on
DNA strand. Thick green bands indicate exonic regions, purple bands
UTRs, and otherwise intronic regions. Bar lengths indicate log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) improvement, where red indicates significance at p < 0.05 and
blue indicates nonsignificance. Scale is given at bottom right.
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Figure 2.4: (A) Permutation tests showed significant association of DAT1,
DRD2, and COMT with individual variation in learning rate (all p < 0.05).
Color coding and interpretation are identical to Fig. 2.3A. (B) To capture
how genetic variation affects the learning rate, we split gene-weighted ρGi
values into quartiles and calculated the mean individual-level ρFi values
(error bars are SEM). (C) Effect of genetic variation on choice behavior is
illustrated using correlogram of investment level at time t with payoff
deviation at time t± lag. The x-axis represents different lags in number of
rounds. Blue dashed lines indicate theoretical 95% confidence interval.
Note the higher correlation values between periods 15–30 in high-ρ relative
to low-ρ individuals. (D) Individual SNP associations for learning rate
parameter ρ are shown on DNA strand. Color coding and interpretation are
identical to Fig. 2.3D.
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causes changes in the catalytic activity of COMT and has been widely stud-
ied in the literature (Figs. 2.2D and 2.3D) (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006).
Seven other SNPs produce synonymous mutations that do not cause a change
in the protein sequence. The vast majority of SNPs are located in intron se-
quences (60/79) or in the 3′ or 5′ UTRs of the target genes (11/79) (Figs.
2.3D and 2.4D). Furthermore, we computed the fit improvement for each
SNP in the implicated genes (Figs. 2.3D and 2.4D and SI Materials and
Methods). Consistent with the idea of multiple SNPs each exerting a weak
influence on behavior, we observed that most SNPs exerted a small effect on
our two learning parameters (Figs. 2.3D and 2.4D). We also explored the
complementary notion that interactions between SNPs account for variation,
finding qualitatively similar results (Table A.4 and SI Results).
Discussion
There is now increasingly detailed knowledge of two physical substrates re-
sponsible for behavior: the brain and the genome (Robinson et al., 2005).
Here, we build upon these insights to shed light on the complex process by
which genomic variation influences behavior through its impact on neural
circuitry. Importantly, and similar to previous discussions in the compu-
tational neuroimaging literature, results from our computational approach
should not be interpreted as an exercise to “localize Greek letters” in the
genome (O’Reilly and Mars, 2011). Just as it would be erroneous for neu-
roimaging researchers to interpret a particular brain region as a “prediction
error module” or “a region encoding δ,” in the same way it would be mistaken
to interpret our results as suggesting that dopamine genes function as “belief
learning genes” or “genes encoding δ.” Rather, our goal is to test hypotheses
regarding how variations in dopamine genes serve to constrain and regulate
the computational properties of neural circuits subserved by dopamine.
More specifically, our results add to growing evidence that dopamine mech-
anisms critically underlie a wide class of value-based decision making across
both social and nonsocial settings (O’Connell and Hofmann, 2012). They are
consistent with a mechanism whereby neural computations related to the an-
ticipation and response of actions of others are governed by dopamine genes
involved in signal termination in PFC—primarily COMT and MAOA/B. Be-
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cause prefrontal dopamine clearance mechanisms are slower than striatal, the
PFC is thought to be sensitive to tonic, but not phasic, dopamine (Garris
and Wightman, 1994). This has led to the hypothesis that tonic prefrontal
dopamine levels are important in maintaining active representations of rel-
evant information and mediate learning after negative consequences (Frank
et al., 2007). In our case, these functions might be relevant for maintaining a
model of the partner’s behavior and learning through belief-based prediction
errors (Zhu et al., 2012).
Furthermore, and in common with basic RL mechanisms, our results sug-
gest that variation in proteins that affect dopamine signaling and clearance
mechanisms in the striatum influence valuation of past experience in action
selection. A possible mechanism proposed in the literature suggests that
these variants modulate dopamine concentrations in meso-temporal scale
(tens of milliseconds) by regulating phasic dopaminergic signaling in the stria-
tum. In contrast, the effects of COMT on the learning rate is likely indirect
and primarily operates through its effects on the balance of dopamine levels
in frontostriatal circuits (Dreher et al., 2009). In humans, these hypothe-
ses can be tested indirectly by pharmacological manipulations on protein
function (Pessiglione et al., 2006).
At the molecular level, the explanatory power of polymorphisms not af-
fecting protein structure raises the intriguing possibility that biochemical
differences are caused by polymorphisms that do not directly affect protein
sequence and function. For example, synonymous mutations in COMT have
been shown to affect catalytic efficiency through regulation of translational
efficiency (Nackley et al., 2006). More generally, synonymous mutations are
known to affect mRNA stability, transcriptional machinery binding affin-
ity, and splicing, which can have significant consequences, as evidenced by
the fact that they are often under selective pressure. UTR and intronic
mutations, however, are likely to fall in upstream/downstream regulatory
sequences where they could affect translation efficiency and protein levels
(Chatterjee and Pal, 2009).
Methodologically, we provide a tractable approach to connect gene and be-
havior by leveraging our knowledge of the intermediate neural mechanisms.
Unlike unconstrained hypothesis-free tests on individual polymorphisms, fo-
cusing on biological pathways allows us to relate systems of functionally re-
lated genes to putative mechanistic models of behavior. That is, we explicitly
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acknowledge the inherent tension regarding our current state of knowledge
(Ebstein et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010). On the one hand, we now have
an immense and growing base of knowledge regarding the biological basis
of economic behavior, which can explain observation across multiple biolog-
ical levels and, in some cases, across multiple species (Rangel et al., 2008;
Ebstein et al., 2010). On the other hand, our knowledge is highly incom-
plete. Pathway analysis based on GWA data thus can complement these
studies by testing multiple dopaminergic pathway genes for association with
decision-making tasks rather than solely relying on an individual SNP ap-
proach (Ebstein et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010).
Taken together, these findings highlight the dissociable roles of dopamine
genes in strategic learning and support the notion that variations in molecu-
lar mechanisms, organized along specific genetic pathways and brain circuits,
form an important source of variation in complex phenotypes such as strate-
gic behavior. More generally, these data suggest the intriguing possibility
that, although complex phenotypes such as economic behavior are highly
polygenic, the information is sparsely distributed across the genetic code
and concentrated within specific functionally defined biological pathways.
Materials and Methods
Participants A total of 218 (103 female) undergraduates were recruited
from the Behavioral × Biological Economics and Social Sciences (B2ESS)
Laboratory at the National University of Singapore. A total of 217 (103
female) were included in the final analysis after one subject was excluded
owing to genotype unavailability (SI Materials and Methods).
Procedure Participants completed 240 rounds of the patent race game in
sessions of 18–24 participants, alternating between strong and weak roles over
120 rounds, counterbalanced. Informed consent was obtained as approved
by the Internal Review Board at the National University of Singapore (SI
Materials and Methods).
Genotype Selection and Preprocessing For each dopamine gene (Fig.
2.1B), SNPs were included according to hg18 coordinates, and with MAF
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exceeding 0.1. DRD5 was excluded from the final analysis owing to lack of
SNP variation in our sample. For details, including coding of VNTRs and
X-chromosome genes, see SI Materials and Methods.
Computational Modeling Denote ski as strategy k (investment level)
for player i, si(t) the chosen strategy by player i at period t, and s−i (t)
the chosen strategy of the opponent at period t. For each round, player
i receives possible payoff πi(s
k
i , s−i(t)) for playing strategy s
k
i in period t,
and the subjective value V ki (t) for playing strategy k is governed by two
parameters and updates according to the following:
V ki (t) =




i , s−i(t))− V ki (t− 1)
]
if ski = si(t)
V ki (t− 1) + 1Nt
[
δi · πi(ski , s−i(t))− V ki (t− 1)
]
if ski 6= si(t)
where N(t) = ρi · N(t − 1) + 1 captures how V ki (t) depreciates over time
(for details, see SI Methods).
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Chapter 3
Persuasion: Laboratory Evidence of Cognitive
Limits When Updating on Biased Information
Introduction
A claimed increase in political polarization has, with increasing frequency,
been blamed on echo chambers—social and media networks with homoge-
neous views, opinions, and beliefs—made possible by the wealth of informa-
tion choices available online (Prior, 2013). In an information age take on
Schelling’s explanation of emergent segregation, “echo chambers” are com-
monly explained as the result of people’s preferences, either for having their
own opinions reinforced, avoiding disagreement, some combination of the two,
or another mechanism altogether (Garrett, 2009). Selective exposure filters
valuable information and viewpoints, hindering learning while increasing the
relative exposure to a narrow set of beliefs (Prior, 2013).
In principle, even a constant stream of biased information need not result in
biased beliefs. Though echo chambers filter out useful information rationally
accounting for bias can still result in unbiased beliefs, a recurring finding
in the study of persuasion games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). Intuitively,
a voter confronted with ex-post weak supporting evidence should be more
likely to conclude that the previously opposing viewpoint may be correct.
Someone who claims to have “nothing to hide” while also actively concealing
information should be met with extreme skepticism.
Nevertheless, there are gradations involved, and rationality provides only
a sharp prediction. The goal of the present study is to provide a quantitative
basis for modeling how people respond to biased information. I accomplish
this by developing a novel sender-receiver experimental design, which I call
the Campaign Game, that produces as output the influence of biased infor-
mation relative to unbiased information. I test the robustness of my results
by considering an almost minimally simple-yet-interesting setting, and also
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by adding a treatment in which motives and strategy are salient, mirroring
public disclosures of conflicts of interest. I focus on the bias created by se-
lectivity, so all information presented is known to be truthful (Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005; Hayakawa and Hayakawa, 1990).
I find that people, far from handling information rationally, process biased
information at close to face value, i.e. naively, favoring the sender. Reducing
the level of uncertainty and complexity of the task does not change this re-
sult, nor does making the bias more salient. The results point to a heuristic
response to information that leads people to be unwittingly persuaded rela-
tive to a rational actor, despite believing they are compensating for the bias
effectively. While people are able to update on information, they are poor at
integrating the strategic component.
At the individual level, a surprising number of people responded to truthful
biased information by severely under-valuing the biased information. Since
the biased information was truthful, and indeed reveals more information
about the state of the world than unbiased, unselective information, this
strategy leads to much greater error. One interpretation worth exploring is
that a lack of trust goes hand-in-hand with a counterproductive heuristic.
The main task, inspired by a model of political persuasion (Polborn and
Yi, 2006), features two candidates choosing a single message to convince a
decisive–yet–uninformed voter, who wants to choose the one with the high-
est quality. The equilibrium prediction is that the candidates will choose
the message that looks most favorable to them. Under rationality, the voter
recognizes this fact and uses the witnessed messages to infer properties of
messages that the candidate did not choose. By carefully setting the dis-
tributions of key variables, candidates are able to play a relatively simple
strategy (e.g., choose the highest absolute value message) that is nonethe-
less optimal for a continuum possible voter decision rules, including rational,
naive, and sophisticated reasoning (Camerer et al., 2004).
A key innovation of my design is to present the voter with two messages,
one from a candidate, and the other chosen non-strategically (at random).
Besides allowing for individual-level analysis, results can be interpreted in a
manner agnostic to alternative theoretical frameworks under consideration,
especially with regards to risk preferences, where there has been significant
advances in developing alternatives to expected utility (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992).
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By documenting a widespread cognitive shortcoming in a manner that
can be developed into a form more amenable for theoretical researchers, I
hope to provide a useful tool for the study of persuasion, whether in politics,
media, courts of law, or markets. While bounded rationality has certainly
been acknowledged, often inspiring clever workarounds (see Milgrom, 2008;
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010, for examples), the concrete data point I provide
suggests that cherry-picking information is more persuasive than assumed by
previous models.
The Campaign Game
My experiment revolves around a simple game featuring biased disclosure,
in which two competing players selectively reveal information in an attempt
to persuade the decision-maker.
Model
In deference to the political model in (Polborn and Yi, 2006), which serves
as the inspiration for my framework, I refer to the persuading players as
Candidates A and B and the decision-maker as the Voter.
In this election, the Voter is indifferent between the candidates’ policies,
but they still prefer to elect the candidate with a higher overall quality.
Candidates A and B are office-motivated and characterized by a tuple of
quality values determined by Nature, and the sum of these values determine
their overall quality. More concretely,
A = a1 + a2 + z
B = b1 + b2
where A and B denote that player’s overall quality and a1, a2, b1, b2 and z are
independent random variables uniformly distributed from −0.5 to 0.5. Notice
that the a priori medians of A and B are equal (i.e. P (A > B) = P (B > A)).
Distributions are common knowledge.
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Players have non-overlapping information sets, partitioned such that no
player can be certain whether one candidate has a strictly greater overall
quality. This is true even when z is constrained to equal zero.
IA = {a1, b2}
IB = {b1, a2}
IV = {z}
with IV denoting the Voter’s information.
Although the information sets are constructed to facilitate eventual im-
plementation in an experiment, those looking for intuition might envisage
candidates as narcissists, able to see only the good (first quality) in them-
selves and the bad (second quality) in others. The z value can be thought of
as the Voter’s predisposition to Candidate A (if positive) or the Candidate
B (if negative), or, equivalently, an external shock to the state of the world
favoring one candidate’s skills or background over the other, as in Krasa and
Polborn (2010).
Before the vote is cast, one candidate can influence the Voter by revealing
one of the quality values in a message (their campaign strategy). Specifically,
the game proceeds as follows:
t = 0: Nature determines candidate qualities.
t = 1: Candidates each select a campaign strategy, si ∈ Ii, for i ∈ A,B.
t = 2: Nature selects s ∈ sA, sB (with equal chance) and reveals it to
the Voter. The source of the message is also revealed.
t = 3: The Voter casts their (decisive) vote.
t = 4: The chosen candidate earns a payoff of 1, otherwise 0. The
Voter earns a payoff of 1 if their choice is greater than or equal to the
defeated candidate’s quality, otherwise 0.
Player incentives, choice and information sets, and a priori distributions
of random variables are common knowledge. Notice that the Voter receives
only one candidate’s message.
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Rational candidate strategy The Voter choosing between A and B is
ignorant of the true values. If we interpret ai and bi as measures of compe-
tence or quality in the ith dimension, then a candidate can choose to laud
their own strengths, or attack the other’s weakness.
The optimal strategy for Candidate A is to send s = arg max(a0,−b0),
i.e. the signal that is more extremely positive about A or extremely negative
about B, and vice versa for Candidate B. Since a and b are independent
and identically uniformly distributed, the optimality of this simple strategy
may hold even when the Voter plays non-equilibrium strategies. Crucially, it
is optimal if the Voter naively ignores the strategic component of the game
(treating z and si similarly), is completely rational (in the Bayesian-Nash
sense), or any convex combination of the two, such as in models with k-level
sophistication (Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006).
Voter strategy is independent of risk-preferences For both intuition
and subsequent analysis, it is useful to reconfigure the Bayesian Nash solu-
tion into a general decision process that relies on only minimal assumptions
about preferences and decision-making under risk. Informally, the Voter is
comparing the likely favorable campaign signal, s, against any counteracting
information in z.
The Campaign game features a binary choice for a binary outcome. In any
decision theoretic framework under risk, this reduces the problem to deciding
which of the two candidates is more likely to have the higher quality. Even
non-linear probability weighting functions are monotonic (e.g. Gonzalez and
Wu, 1999), so it is sufficient to model the Voter’s beliefs about the conditional
median.
Since only the relative strengths of each option is needed to make a deci-
sion, I refer to x, the agent’s belief about the relative expectations of the two
options given information I. If x > 0, then A is chosen, and if x < 0, B is
chosen. The agent is indifferent when x = 0. For a rational decision-maker,
x updates so that x = E[A|I]− E[B|I].
Let s represent a normalized informative signal oriented so that greater
values favor the sender, i.e where E[s] = 0 and s > s′ ⇒ E[A|s] > E[A|s′].
The updating process can be decomposed into two aspects: the Bayesian,
and the social.
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xt+1 = xt + A(st) +B(st)
where xt represents the agent’s beliefs at the start of period t. B(·) = 0 if
st is unmotivated.
For the symmetric messaging task with s ∼ U [−ν, ν], the agent’s rational
(Bayesian Nash) strategy is for
A(s) = s
B(s) =
−ν−s2 if s is motivated,0 if s is unmotivated. (3.1)
Not every agent is likely to behave rationally, however. Therefore, a gen-
eralization that allows some room to fit the data is preferable. For example,
A(s) = s
B(s) =
β0 + β1s+ β2s2 + · · ·+ βnsn if s is motivated,0 if s is unmotivated.
This specification assumes that an individual receiving two (independent)
unmotivated signals, valued s and −s, is left indifferent between the two
choices. It also normalizes to unmotivated signals, so that x = E[A|s] −
E[B|s] when s is unmotivated, and so that motivated signals can be measured
against a useful standard of comparison. For example, in the rational case,
signals from motivated senders are biased by β0 = −ν/2 and β1 = −1/2,
compared to the same message from an unmotivated sender.
Let X and Y denote independent random variables. I remind the reader
of the following mathematical facts:
1. If X is a symmetric random variable, then E[X] = M[X], where M[X]
is the median of X.
2. If X and Y are independent and symmetric, then Z = X + Y is also
symmetric, and E[Z] = M[Z].
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Note that the posterior distribution given the optimal sender strategy is
symmetric, thanks to the uniform distribution of ai and bi.
Working with the median allows for consistency with running experiments,
as the payoff to the agent-subjects can be binary when a choice between A
and B is made, rather than a function of the squared difference.
The second fact allows the behavioral model to extend naturally when
multiple signals are received, as long as those signals, and the associated
random variables, are independent. As desired, observing opposing unmoti-
vated signals s and −s leaves the agent with the same x. Also, integrating
information from motivated and unmotivated signals is simple. If an moti-
vated signal changes x from 0 to x = x′ > 0, an unmotivated message of
s < −x′ would be needed to change the agent’s choice to B.
An agent with an initial belief of x = 0 that receives n ≤ N signals has a


















This decision rule in the case when the Voter has one motivated and one
unmotivated message is visualized in figure 3.1. The value of motivated
message is depicted along the x-axis, with the value of the unmotivated state
information shown along the y-axis. The range of both variables is identical
and normalized to one, with a median of zero. For both signals, the more
positive the value, the more favorable that message is for the candidate whose
message is received by the Voter, e.g. if the Voter is exposed to Candidate
A’s message, then either a1 = 0.5 or b2 = −0.5 represents a maximally
favorable signal for Candidate A and would be plotted on the right side.
Likewise, a shock of z = 0.5 is maximally favorable to Candidate A and
would be plotted at the top. Since a decision rule partitions this space, the
weighted and adjusted sum of two signals is either above or below 0, a voter’s
decision rule can be represented by a line depicting the partition boundary,
with a voter choosing the sending candidate only if the received signals are
in upper-right partition.
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Figure 3.1: Voter strategy space. The x-axis denotes the Sender’s message,
with values to the right being more favorable to the Sender. The y-axis
denotes the unbiased media message, with messages favorable to the
Sender. Partition boundaries for the naive (through the origin) and rational
models are shown. A voter receiving two messages in the top-right of the
space should choose the Sender.
Two strategies are represented in Fig. 3.1. The first is the naive model,
where the Voter treats both motivated and unmotivated signals equally
(B(s) = s). It is represented by the diagonal line passing through the origin.
The rational voter requires more from a candidate, of course, and this is visu-
ally apparent from the second line. Relative to the naive voter, the rational
voter’s partition boundary has a steeper slope. Both lines intersect at the
bottom right, corresponding to motivated signal of 0.5 and an unmotivated
signal of −0.5—since the candidate would always be expected to send such a
favorable signal when available, the rational voter cannot infer anything else
about what the candidate did not reveal. Also relative to the naive voter,
the set of circumstances in which the rational voter would elect the sending
candidate is markedly smaller and, indeed, a strict subset of when the naive
voter would. Despite the visuals, however, this does not mean we expect the
rational voter to rarely elect the sending candidate, since a voter is much
more likely to see favorable messages from the candidate.
Since the optimal candidate strategy does not change for either naive or
rational voters, the rational model also includes sophisticated voter types.
37
Sophisticated voters (k-step or k-level), behave optimally given beliefs about
the level of rationality in other players (Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes
and Crawford, 2006; Nagel, 1995). Assuming the lowest level of rationality is
naive voter play, the optimal candidate behavior does not change. Therefore,
the sophisticated voter’s optimal response is identical to the rational voter’s
strategy.
A variation without quality z I will also refer to a second variation on
this game that does not use the quality z, reducing the a priori variance of
A − B. Alternatively, think of the case where z must equal 0. The game
proceeds as before, except that Nature selects an additional, unmotivated,
message to reveal at t = 2.
...
t = 2: Nature selects i ∈ A,B (with equal chance).
In addition, Nature selects a quality u−i ∈ I−i (with equal
chance), where −i denotes the candidate whose campaign message is
not revealed.
Both si and u−i are revealed to the Voter with their sources.
The source of u−i is referred to as the Media.
...
The candidates’ optimal strategy is unchanged, as there is no overlap be-
tween the choice set available to the candidate whose message the Voter sees
and the set of possibilities available to the Media; the candidate’s choice has
no influence on the unmotivated signal. So, if the Voter is told that A chooses
to reveal a1, then the Voter’s second signal is either b1 or a2. There is no
chance that the Voter will learn b2.
Also, the Voter still receives one motivated and one unmotivated signal in
both variations. Fig. 3.1 is representative of voter strategy in both treat-
ments.
Experiment Design
I operationalized the Campaign Game as a computer-based laboratory ex-
periment implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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As described above, a decisive voter is tasked with choosing between two
candidates, who may reveal one of two quality values. The Voter can choose
either candidate, or to pass (abstain) and choose neither. In the case of
abstentions, the elected candidate is chosen at random with equal probability,
so that the Voter wins at 50 percent. Passing serves as a rationality check,
as this is never the strictly optimal strategy.
The message option for candidates is framed as either emphasizing their
own Pros or the Opponent’s Cons. Fig. 3.2 shows examples of a candidate’s
decision screen (though the actual screen in z-Tree has a black background).
Values are presented numerically and visually (to the same scale), to facilitate
comparison and decision-making. The upper end of the distribution is always
shown on the right, so that the rightmost Pros value is very favorable to the
candidate, but a rightmost Cons value (suggesting a high-valued Opponent)
is unfavorable. To make the task easier to motivate, Pros are positive-valued
and Cons are negative-valued, though the range is identical. The a priori
median total quality is 0 for both candidates. Candidates are only required
to use the keyboard to make their decisions.
The Voter decision screen is presented in Fig. 3.3 (though, again, the z-
Tree screen has a black background). As before, values associated with the
candidate’s and media messages are presented numerically and visually to the
same scale. Rightmost values reflect the upper end of the distribution. As
with candidates, Voters are only required to use the keyboard to make their
decisions. Also, in the interest of symmetry, the shock term, z, is presented
as a media message.
Feedback at the end of each round includes whether the round was suc-
cessful for the player, the true quality values, which candidate’s message
was revealed to the Voter, and the contents of both candidate and media
messages.
Although not necessarily obvious for a task requiring only one biased mes-
sage, having two candidates with symmetric roles allows me to control for
two subtle confounds. For one, the payoff distribution between candidates is
now independent of the Voter’s choice. Social preferences, which may oth-
erwise encourage voters to choose another participant, which have been well
established in the behavioral economics and even neural level (Charness and
Rabin, 2002; Tricomi et al., 2010). Also, since both candidates make deci-
sions and apply similar effort, the voters should not feel that one candidate
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Figure 3.2: Candidate Screen Layout (No-shock version). Message values
are presented numerically and graphically. The Shock version is identical,
except that Voter gets Media reports is replaced with Shock Range: −100
to 100 in the information box.
Figure 3.3: Voter Screen Layout (No-shock version). Message values are
presented numerically and graphically. For the Shock version, a visually
similar media report would read A Shock of −50 affects Candidate B, with
the Worst/Best labels altered to −100 and 100. The information box would
also include the line Shock Range: −100 to 100.
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or the other is more active or deserving. The effect of nonactivity was found
to have an effect in economics experiments in, for example, studies of asset
bubble formation in the laboratory (Lei et al., 2001). Another strength of
this design is the use of real people to make biased choices. Besides avoiding
the problems of deception in experiments, studies of brain activation in social
decision-making tasks has found differences in how people think when playing
identical tasks with other people or a computer (e.g. Zhu et al., 2012).
Information Choice Task In a variation of the main task, some voter
players were asked to play one round of a related game, which I call the
Information Choice Task. In this task, voters will receive only one message
before deciding, but they can choose which message to receive (from Candi-
date A, Candidate B, the random Media, or none). Some individuals were
selected to play this task, in private, for an additional potential earning of
$5.
Choosing no message is clearly irrational. The rational choice is to choose a
message from a candidate, as their choice contains more information. Though
choosing Media is not the rational response, an argument could be made for
it if one accepts their own bounded rationality.
This task is presented as a single question at the end of the main Campaign
Game task. Not every session participated in this task.
Candidate play database and voter-only sessions Because the em-
phasis of this study is on the voter role, and to improve experiment control
and mitigate costs, participants were assigned to the candidate role in only
one session of each treatment (with and without the shock, z). In these ses-
sions, each round of play matched participants into random groups of three
participants (two candidates and one voter).
In subsequent sessions, only the Voter role was assigned. Voters were
matched with candidates and their choices from the earlier, participant-
candidate sessions. Instructions in these voter-only sessions were identical,
except that 1) participants were told at the end of the instructions (including
candidate instructions) that they were assigned the voter role, and 2) that
they would be matched with candidates who made their choices in earlier
sessions.
Behavior between voters in voter-only and live-candidate sessions was not
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significantly different. Subsequent analysis includes voters from both types
of sessions.
Procedure and Experiment
Sessions were run in October 2015 at the University of Illinois. Subjects were
recruited through flyers and emails sent to students attending undergradu-
ate economics lectures. Interested students registered with a mailing list and
were notified of upcoming sessions. Upon receiving notification, participants
signed up for a specific session, space permitting. 71 (mean age = 19.6 (se
= 2.46); 53 percent female) subjects in total participated, with 10 candi-
dates each in the shock and no-shock conditions (high and low uncertainty).
In total, 25 voters played in the shock condition, and 26 in the non-shock
condition.
Sessions proceeded as follows:
1. Subjects enter laboratory and are seated. Identification recorded to
prevent repeat participation. Participants are assigned randomly to
high or low treatment condition. Each participant is given a unique,
random ID.
2. Subjects give informed consent, read instructions, and complete a com-
prehension quiz in private. They also enter their random ID into their
computer.
3. The comprehension quiz is evaluated individually and in private by an
experimenter. Subjects retake the quiz until all answers are correct.
4. After all subjects have completed the comprehension quiz, an experi-
menter starts the computerized task and player roles are assigned. The
above steps take from ten to twenty minutes.
5. After completing the computerized task, the computer reports their
earnings from the task. subjects are the directed to a survey. Depend-
ing on the session, the survey has one or two parts.
– Part I: Information Choice Task
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– Part II: A survey that asks for demographic information, political
attitudes, and a request to outline their thought process when
making decisions during the main task.
6. Subjects were paid in cash and in private, after completing the survey.
A random number of subjects (depending on the session size) were
selected to play the Information Choice Task (details below).
Subjects play 70 rounds of the Campaign Game in total. The first 10
rounds are used to become familiar with the task and are not included in
the final analysis. Subjects were paid $2 for each success in ten randomly
selected rounds. In addition to their task earnings, all subjects received a $5
participation fee. Average earnings in the task was approximately $20.
Sessions with live candidates took approximately 1.5 hours. Sessions with
only voters took approximately one hour.
Verifying that candidates are experimentally controlled
Before turning to the limits of voter rationality, it is necessary to establish
that candidates’ choices conform to the rational model. By design, the can-
didate role is simpler and easier to play. Overall, the twenty subjects in this
role perform according to my prediction.
Candidates’ choices are good enough for the empirical best voter strategy
to lie very close to the rational prescription, as intended. Fig. 3.6 overlays
a theoretical voter’s best strategy (in magenta) given the actual candidates’
choices, the actual messages seen by voters, and the actual superior candi-
date. The logit estimate almost perfectly overlays the rational prediction
partition (p = 0.48), is distinctly different from the naive prediction (the
long diagonal).
A more detailed look at their decisions confirms the candidates’ rationality.
In the experiment, Pros are positive-valued (0 to 200) and Cons are negative-
valued (−200 to 0), with the range for both being 200. Since Cons always
refer to the opponent, the optimal candidate strategy for a wide-range of
plausible voter behaviors is to select the message with the higher absolute
value. Since all random variables are drawn from uniform distributions, I
expect Pros and Cons to be selected half the time.
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This is generally true. Fig. 3.4 shows the proportion of Pro and Con mes-
sages selected by candidates. Across both the Normal and Low Uncertainty
treatments, Pros were selected slightly less often (47.1 percent), owing pri-
marily to chance. Overall, candidates chose as predicted 87.8 percent of
the time. The prediction was slightly better in the Normal treatment (90.5
percent) than in the Low Uncertainty treatment (85.2).
Fig. 3.5 shows candidate choice depending on the specific options pre-
sented. Pro values are on the x-axis, and Con values on the y-axis. Axes are
normalized to range from −0.5 to 0.5. The top-left subfigure represents the
choice space, with the optimal candidate strategy illustrated as a diagonal di-
viding the space through the origin. Candidate choices from both treatments
are combined in the top-right subfigure, and the individual treatments are
presented at the bottom-left (normal, with a shock) and bottom-right (low
uncertainty, without a shock). Blue dots represent a choice by the candidate
to send a Pro message. In each figure, the optimal strategy describes the par-
tition well. Although some subjects expressed a predisposition to choosing
Pros (or Cons) in certain situations, within the larger dataset the deviations
are essentially unsystematic.
Results
Normal and Low Uncertainty Treatments
Having established that candidate players behaved in line with rational
(Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) predictions, and having also established that
the empirically optimal voter strategy would be to play according to the
rational prediction, I now check whether rational does indeed prevail.
Model-free comparison In fact, the voters elect the sender candidate
more often than is rational. Fig. 3.7 illustrates a model-free comparison of
voter choices against the predictions of the rational voter choice model given
the realized messages. Voters choose the candidate whose campaign message
was viewed (the Sender; 59.4 percent) appreciably more than they chose the
opposing, non-sending candidate (the Opponent; 37.3 percent). In contrast,
a rational voter would have chosen both Sender and Opponent in near equal
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Figure 3.4: Candidate Choice. Sending Pros vs. Cons. Slightly more
situations emerged where Cons was the optimal strategy.
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Figure 3.5: Candidate Choice. Counter-clockwise from top-left: Partion for
the optimal strategy. Candidate choices in both conditions (Pros in blue).
Candidate choices in the condition low uncertainty condition (without a
shock). Candidate choices in the high uncertainty condition (with a shock).
Figure 3.6: Optimal voter choice given actual candidate play. The empirical
optimal agrees with the theoretical equilibrium rational response.
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Figure 3.7: Model-free comparison of votes. Sender denotes the candidate
whose message was viewed by the voter in that particular round. Though
the rational model predicts an equal distribution between Sender and
Opponent, voters in actuality were more likely to choose the Sender, to
their deficit. Voters also passed in a small number of rounds, which is never
strictly rational.
proportions (50.4 percent for the Sender). Voters also chose to pass (abstain)
in 3.3 percent of rounds. Since passing grants an essentially 50 percent chance
of winning, it is never strictly rational to pass in the current task. Behavior
in both conditions was similar, hence choices were aggregated in the current
figure.
Over-selecting Sender costs the voter. On average, rational voters could
expect to choose correctly three times for every one loss (noting that this
differs slightly depending on the condition, as the Shock treatment has more
uncertainty). Voters were able to achieve this when choosing to elect the
Opponent (74.7 percent success), but were much less successful when they
went with the Sender, with a win/loss ratio of less than two-to-one (65.5
percent success). Abstaining predictably wins half the time.
With even this crude analysis, there is evidence that voters were success-
fully persuaded by the candidate’s message.
Partitions in message space Projecting voter choice onto the message
space enables another, more nuanced comparison to putative models. In
Fig. 3.8, Voter choices are plotted on the message space, with Votes for the
Sender colored in blue and decisions to abstain colored green. As before, the
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partitions implied by the naive and rational model are dilineated in black.
The thicker, orange line depicts the partition estimated by nonparametric
logistic regression (Hastie, 2017), with smoothing applied to both candidate
and media messages. Observations in which the voter abstained were dropped
from logistic regression estimates.
First, message values were normalized to range from −0.5 to 0.5, so that
the a priori median equals 0. Furthermore, messages in each round were
oriented so that the greater the value, the more favorable the message was
to the Sender in that round. For example, a message from Candidate A that
revealed that B’s Cons was an abysmal −200 is converted to 0.5, as it is
maximally favorable for Candidate A. A media message that revealed A’s
Cons to be −150, which is less than the a priori median of −100, is coded
as −0.25.
As in the earlier model-free analysis, Fig. 3.8 makes clear that voters are
overreacting to the Sender’s messages. Despite the high degree of freedom
possible in a nonparametric analysis, the estimated partition boundary does
not coincide or cross the line denoting the rational partition, except in the
case of an extremely positive message where estimation error is more likely.
A partition boundary that crosses the rational partition boundary would
indicate a range where voters might have under-reacted to the information
revealed by the candidate. Instead, the partition is by-and-large linear and
essentially parallel to the partition boundary predicted by a completely naive
voter, though with a clear gap. Such a gap would coincide with voters adding
a small penalty when evaluating information from candidates, for example.
A linear model seems appropriate in this case, with the added advantage
of translating simply to the decision model developed earlier. To determine
the partition assuming a constant weighting between both messages, the




= α + βssi,t + βuui,t.
with p being the probability of a vote for the Sender, and si,t and ui,t being
the sender-oriented and normalized value of the messages from the Sender
and the (unbiased) Media, respectively, for individual i in round t.
The partition boundary is where the p = 0.5, i.e. the left side equals zero.
Since I plot the unbiased message on the y-axis, the intercept and slope of
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Figure 3.8: Actual voter Choice, nonparametric partitions estimates. Voters
are not rational. The no-shock treatment is in the upper-left. The
combined data is below.
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the partition is simply
intercept = −α/βu
slope = −βs/βu
Referring back to the decision model developed earlier, this boundary also
gives us an equation for B(s) in equation 3.1, assuming a linear partition.
A(s) = s
B(s) =
−α/βu + (βs/βu − 1)s if s is motivated,0 if s is unmotivated.
Fig. 3.9 illustrates the result of this analysis. The rational model is strongly
rejected (p < 0.00). The estimated B function is (delta-method standard-
errors in parentheses):
B(s) = −0.03(0.01) + 0.07(0.04)s
Individual analysis
Since individual voters simultaneously receive both neutral and biased mes-
sages, subject-specific estimates are possible. Although some subjects come
very close to the rational solution, voters predominantly behave more in line
with the naive prediction, essentially taking calculated messages at face value.
And many adopt an intuitive strategy that actually increases the chances of
making a mistake.
I started by applying the model to the individual data, estimating the
linear model using logistic regression and then determining the partition
boundary where the probability of choosing the Sender or Opponent was
equal. As with the aggregate data, the intercept and slope of this partition
boundary was computed for each individual. Rounds in which the subject
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Figure 3.9: Actual voter Choice, parametric partitions estimates. The
no-shock treatment is in the upper-left.
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did not choose either candidate (passed) were dropped. Although some indi-
viduals’ choices might be better explained by higher-order specifications, the
emphasis is on the overall pattern under a common, valid framework. Indeed,
some subjects’ choices are perfectly partitioned under the linear model, sup-
porting the idea that the linear model is closely aligned with how individuals
perceived the decision task.
I was interested in two main aspects of individual behavior. The first was
the implied cost of their behavior, and the second was whether clusters or
behavioral types could be observed. To determine the cost, I computed the
expected error rate given a rational candidate player and normalized it so
that rational play (the best possible given the available information) scored
a zero, and naive play scored one. Since the candidates are presumed to
be rational, voters would be more likely to see candidate messages that are
above the median than below, and the error rates take this into account. To
visualize type clusters, I applied a two-dimensional kernel density estimation
procedure with the kde2d function in R’s MASS package, using the individual
slope and intercept estimates as inputs. The normal reference bandwidth and
500 grid points in each direction were used.
Fig. 3.10 shows the results of the individual-level analysis. On the left, the
normalized error rate for the sample is presented as an empirical cumulative
distribution function. The right subfigure displays the result of the kernel
density estimation, with the slope of the partition boundary on the x-axis and
the intercept on the y-axis. Reference points for the rational (intercept 0.25,
slope −1.25) and naive (intercept 0, slope −1) models are plotted with black
dots. The kernel density plot focuses on the main features of the analysis
and some outliers are not contained within the display area.
In examining the implied error rates of the individuals’ strategies, we notice
that there is considerable variation in performance, with a small fraction
performing almost as well as the ideal rational agent. However, the more
striking feature is that overall performance is poor; approximately half the
subjects could be expected to make more errors than someone who naively
took strategic messages at face value. This seems counterintuitive, as the
naive model seems the natural lower bound.
The right subfigure provides some insight into why so many individuals
play strategies that perform worse than simply being naive. Perhaps the
most salient feature of the kernel density plot is the presence of two separate
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Figure 3.10: Individual voter Choice. Left: Empirical cumulative
distribution function of imputed error rates given estimates of individual
partition boundaries. Errors are normalized so that zero denotes the
optimal (rational) error rate and one equals the expected error rate for a
naive agent. The estimated strategies of half the subjects exceeds that of
even the naive agent model. Right: A kernel density plot of estimate
individual partition boundaries. Although some individuals were close to
rational, the modal response is nearly indistinguishable from the naive
model. A substantial portion of subjects incorrectly underweight the
truthful candidate messages relative to neutral information, accounting for
higher error rates. Extreme individuals not shown.
and distinct higher density areas near the rational and, especially, the naive
model predictions. The larger cluster is heavily concentrated near the naive
prediction point, but there is considerable mass to the right, indicating a
partition boundary with a flatter slope for many subjects. This means that
many subjects are influenced less by candidate messages compared to the
neutral information. This accounts for the large number of individuals whose
implied error rate is worse than even the naive model predicts.
To reiterate, many voters respond to strategic motives by discounting the
verifiable, truthful information candidates reveal, in direct opposition to ra-
tionality, which recognizes that choice gives insight into the unrevealed val-
ues. The consequences of this approach would be more error than had the
individual simply processed the information naively.
Reminder treatment: Strategy is salient
To confirm that voters were aware of the strategic nature of the candidates’
messages, I ran an additional treatment in which the motives and likely
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strategy of candidates was highlighted halfway through the session.
Despite choice behavior that seems more naive to strategy than rational,
subjects in the post-experiment survey frequently identified the strategy of
the candidates as a factor in their decision. Since question was intentionally
left open-ended (“Tell us how you made your choices.”) so as not to lead
subjects, it seems reasonable that this was an important factor in many
subjects’ decisions by the end of the experiment.
I ran another treatment in which this point was salient. Before the start
of round forty-one, voters were shown the following message:
Candidates can only choose a truthful message, but they have
two messages to choose from, and will likely go for the one that
makes them look better.
This message does not affect candidates’ choices. Participants in
those sessions were not reminded.
Candidates’ choices were drawn from the same database as in the earlier
treatment. For consistency, both normal and low uncertainty (no shock)
conditions were run.
These sessions were run in April 2016. Recruiting methods were the same
as for the earlier sessions. Overall, 19 subjects participated in the no-shock
condition, and 18 subjects participated in the shock condition.
Reminder treatment: Results
This treatment tests whether irrational voter behavior can be attributed
to voter unawareness of the importance of game structure. However, the
reminder, which highlights the motives of the candidate and explicitly states
their strategy, does not improve the voters’ performance. I conclude that
this aspect of the decision was indeed salient.
To establish this claim, let me first revisit behavior in the earlier sessions.
Fig. 3.11 compares voter choice in the first half of the game (30 rounds) to
choice in the last half. There is no evidence of learning (p > 0.1 using the
linear model). This is not unexpected. Though feedback at the end of each
round is complete, and though subjects were given as much time as needed
to review after each round, the binary payoffs, the voters’ decent (if not
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optimal) success rate, and the formatting of the feedback does not encourage
the development of nuanced changes in behavior.
Fig.s 3.13 and 3.14 show voter behavior in the Reminder treatment, us-
ing nonparametric and parametric model partitions, respectively. The early
rounds serve as our control, and are directly comparable to the previous
sessions. And, as with previous sessions, voters overreact to the Sender’s
message, though not quite as severely as in other sessions. The nonpara-
metric partition also exhibits distinctly more curvature than in previously
rounds, which may be explained by locally influential choices. The linear
model estimate accords well with the estimate in previous sessions.
The later rounds, after the reminder has been shown, is the treatment
condition, shown in the top right subfigure. If merely being unaware of the
importance of the candidates’ motives or their strategy is the only barrier to
voters choosing rationally, behavior after receiving the reminder should be
more rational. However, as is most obvious from the linear model estimate,
the reminder has not improved performance. If anything, voters do worse
after the reminder, though the result is insignificant (p = 0.6751). There is a
visible difference when comparing the nonparametric and higher order model
partitions, but these changes are not clear improvements, and again possibly
due to locally influential choices. The larger subfigure combines data from
all rounds in the Reminder treatment.
I tested whether voters’ naive performance in earlier sessions was due to
incorrect beliefs about the candidates’ strategy, or obliviousness to its im-
portance. However, the results of this test, combined with survey responses,
suggest that simple unawareness cannot account for voter choice.
Information choice task
In total, 78 subjects participated in the information choice task at the end of
the main Campaign Game. Of these, 65 percent chose a candidate’s message,
in accordance with the rational model. 32 percent chose the neutral media
message, while 3 percent chose to receive no message at all.
It is interesting that most subjects chose a candidate’s message, which
would be slightly advantageous for a rational voter, but overwhelmingly made
decisions non-rationally in the main task. It is entirely possible that choosing
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Figure 3.11: Voter choice in non-reminder sessions. No evidence of learning
between the early and late rounds. The nonparametric model is shown for
both timeframes.
Figure 3.12: Voter choice in non-reminder sessions. No evidence of learning
between the early and late rounds. The linear model is in magenta, with
quadratic and cubic models underneath.
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Figure 3.13: Voter choice in reminder sessions. No evidence of learning
between the early (top-left) and late rounds (top-right). The nonparametric
model is shown for both timeframes.
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Figure 3.14: Voter choice in reminder sessions. No evidence of learning
between the early (top-left) and late rounds(top-right). The linear model is
in magenta, with quadratic and cubic models underneath.
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a media message would result in the better outcome. Although the results of
this task are primarily exploratory, there is some evidence here that individu-
als may be overconfident about their ability to correct for biased information,
especially when combined with the findings of the reminder treatment.
Mental effort and the anchor-and-adjust heuristic
I found that subjects’ choices could be reasonably captured by a model in
which voters weighed biased the same as neutral information, with a small
penalty that was insensitive to the specific content of the biased message.
Such behavior is consistent with theories in psychology that consider cogni-
tive effort, and specifically with the anchor-and-adjust heuristic.
When did George Washington become president? The anchor-and-adjust
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1975; Epley and Gilovich, 2006) describes
a process of making a decision under uncertainty by starting from some
salient point (the anchor) and adjusting until a plausible estimate is reached.
Although few would recall when George Washington first entered office, many
Americans might arrive at a guess by starting at an anchor of 1776, the year
of the Declaration of Independence, and adjusting upwards from there. This
adjustment, however, is likely to be insufficient, stopping on the anchor side
of the truth (the correct answer is 1789). Despite decades of psychological
research, it is not clear why the adjustments are insufficient, though exper-
iments point to the effortful and serial nature of the adjustment process as
part of the explanation. For example, increasing the cognitive burden has the
effect of reducing the adjustment, exacerbating the error (Epley and Gilovich,
2004).
I propose the anchor-and-adjust heuristic as a first approximation describ-
ing the behavior of voters in the current experiment, except that in the
Campaign Game, unlike explicit tests of the anchoring effect, the anchor is
provided by both the candidates and the voter. The candidate, of course,
provides an anchor by selecting their campaign message. The voter’s con-
tribution, less obvious, is in the interpretation of that signal. Based on the
post-experiment responses, many voters interpreted signals in terms of their
distance from the median. Others paid attention to the values themselves.
The data I have is insufficient to detect the influence of the anchor interpre-
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tation on the subsequent adjustment. As such a mixed-source anchor is a
common part of economic and social life, however—one need only think of
marketing or negotiation—this topic is worth further exploration in future
studies.
Although anchor-interpretation is beyond the experimental data, the ad-
justment process does admit some limited testing. Since adjusting is mentally
fatiguing, one might expect voters in the experiment to adjust more when the
information is easier to process. In the Campaign Game, voters might need
relatively greater mental effort when the sending candidate reveals the op-
ponent’s cons, rather than reveal their own pros. It might also require more
effort when the two messages refer to different candidates. On the other
hand, the layout of the graphical interface ensures that the easiest messages
to parse are when both messages describe the sender.
The data provide some weak support in favor of the effortful-adjustment
conjecture. In aggregate, the intercept shifts significantly (0.067 vs. 0.160,
p = 0.001) when both signals referred directly to the sender (e.g. A’s Pros
and Cons when A sends, or B’s Pros and a shock affecting B when B sends).
Voters still under-adjust relative to the rational prediction of 0.25. The
analysis also rejects the possibility that a less effortful adjustment could apply
to the more serious problem of the relatively similar weighting of motivated
and unmotivated signals.
Constant adjustment of this sort is somewhat suggested by the descrip-
tion of adjusting as a deliberate, serial process, if one assumes that each
adjustment step is not dependent on the magnitude of the motivated signal.
Alas, anchor-and-adjust does not suggest much in the way of step size or how
plausibility is determined.
Discussion
Whether it is reasonable to believe that people have the cognitive capacity to
rationally compensate for biased information has important implications. I
created a setting, framed as political election, in which rational biased agents
could persuade boundedly rational decision-makers so that I could measure
how well individuals process biased information.
I found that voters were aware of the mixed incentives of the candidates,
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yet treated information from both the neutral source and the motivated can-
didates fairly equally, except for a small constant penalty. This pattern
persists in even a minimally complex environment, and despite increased
salience of candidate strategy. A more rational individual would be able to
analyze the game structure and extract information not directly revealed by
the candidates.
At the aggregate level, a consistent finding in all sessions is that vot-
ers systematically overreact to the Sender’s message, in the sense that they
treat these messages as more favorable of the Sender than they are. As the
simple setting constructed in the Campaign Game is simpler than many real-
world scenarios, this is evidence that people are unlikely to infer the hidden
information embedded in a revealed choice. Comparing easier and harder
rounds supports the conjecture that subjects are applying a simple heuristic
to evaluate biased information, which sophisticated persuaders may be able
to exploit.
Heterogeneity is evident at the individual level, with most subjects behav-
ing at or close to naively. A few subjects behave nearly rationally, confirming
that some people recognize the impact of the game structure on information.
Interestingly, many subjects treat the biased messages as less informa-
tive. Although contradictory to the rational model, there is nonetheless an
intuitive appeal to under-responding to a persuasive party. However, an in-
tuitive response in this case leads to greater errors, as subjects are not taking
into account truthful information. Interpreted another way, distrust of the
candidate led some subjects to disregard even clearly truthful information
in support of that candidate. If this pattern holds in other settings, then
the implications are far-reaching. For example, one could imagine how this
behavior could be exploited in a political election. If a political candidate
were able to increase distrust in the opponent (or other institutions), even
verifiable and demonstrable truthful information may be disregarded. The
other side, how high trust in an information source distorts decision-making,
is also worth further investigation.
Qualitatively, this study suggests that people are likely to underestimate
how strongly a biased source is able to provide support for their own po-
sition, even when constrained by explicit or implicit forces to being truth-
ful. This finding complements the theoretical work on Bayesian persuasion
of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the sender is able to persuade
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on average by manipulating the informational environment for a Bayesian
decision-maker. Existing institutional defenses, such as laws requiring dis-
closure of competing interest, may therefore be underpowered, as discussed in
Loewenstein, Sunstein and Golman (2014). These findings may also provide
a simple behavioral explanation for why lobbyists are prized more for their
connections than their expertise (Bertrand et al., 2014); persuasion benefits
both from the ability to present your message and the appearance of trust,
even when information is verifiable.
Other scenarios, such as in marketplaces or courtrooms where competing
biased sources prevail, may create unforeseen distortions.
Disappointment and attitudes to political campaigns
Whatever the mechanism, a mostly naive response to motivated signals
has wide-reaching implications, especially relating to persuasion in markets,
courtrooms, and politics. I elaborate on a less obvious one in the realm that
inspired this research, attitudes towards negative political campaigns. Nega-
tive campaigns, in which politicians attempt to win elections by emphasizing
the shortcomings of their opponent, are a frequent target of complaints by
political observers (Lau and Rovner, 2009). Rationally, however, negative
campaigns can provide important information about candidates that might
not otherwise be revealed. It is not obvious from such an analysis why neg-
ative campaigns are so disliked.
In this section, I proceed as if voters were fully naive. Hopefully it will be
clear that the essential arguments remain intact even after allowing for the
small corrections exhibited by subjects in this study.
The following setup is taken from Polborn and Yi (2006), which provides
more thorough justification. Messages are produced by both campaigns.
These messages are selective, but truthful and verifiable. Furthermore, rev-
elations from the media are likely to be minor relative to the candidates’
own signals. Otherwise, assume we have a scenario similar to the one in
our experiment: pros and cons come from independent but equally uncer-
tain distributions; each candidate can decide whether to adopt a positive or
negative campaign stance, i.e., the choice for candidate i is between send-
ing either sprosi or s
cons
−i ; but now the voter receives one message from each
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candidate, instead of one from a candidate and one from the media.
The candidates are rational. Although generally their optimal response
may differ when the voters are naive or rational, I assume that pros and cons
are identically distributed up to an additive term. Under this condition, a
candidate’s optimal strategy is identical.
The expected quality of candidate i for naive and rational voter types for
the four message combinations in Table 3.1, assuming that sprosi ∈ [0, 2ŝ] and
sconsi ∈ [−2ŝ, 0], so that ŝ = E[s
pros
i ] and −ŝ = E[sconsi ].
Table 3.1: Expected quality given different messages
Type Naive (i) Rational (i)




















i neg, only (scons−i ,s
pros
−i ) ŝ− ŝ = 0 −scons−i /2− s
pros
−i /2
Both negative (scons−i ,s
pros
−i ) ŝ+ s
cons
i −scons−i /2 + sconsi
Table 3.2: Expected surprise for the naive voter if i wins
Type Naive vs. Rational




−i /2 ≥ −ŝ, positive surprise
i pos, only (sprosi ,s
cons
i ) i’s quality revealed. No surprise
i neg, only (scons−i ,s
pros
−i ) If s
pros
−i < −scons−i , positive surprise




−i /2 ≤ −ŝ, negative surprise
Intuitively, both a naive and rational voter can use the same heuristic:
choose the candidate with the more favorable message (in magnitude).
Ex-post, however, the naive voter is likely to be surprised by the actual
quality of the elected candidate (i.e., ex-ante beliefs will systematically differ
from average ex-post revelations). When both candidates engage in a positive
campaign, this may be a pleasant experience—the elected candidate will be
better than expected.
Conversely, when both candidates engage in a negative campaign the naive
voter already forms a poor impression of i, since ŝ+sconsi would tend be below
0 when −i chooses strategy sconsi . Even then, the naive voter will on average
be overestimating i. Even with these already lowered expectations, the naive
voter is likely to experience further disappointment.
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Conclusion
I designed and ran experiments that measure how people use biased informa-
tion in their decisions. The design controls for preferences, including nonstan-
dard phenomenon like social preferences and non-expected utility, and the
behavior of information senders. Decisions for both senders and decision-
makers are incentivized and no deception is required. Also, by presenting
decision-makers with two messages, one a product of strategy and the other
by chance, I am able to compare strategic messages against a meaningful,
flexible yardstick and perform individual analysis.
I find that decision-makers overreact to biased information in the sense that
they are persuaded to side with the self-serving messenger significantly more
than predicted by the rational model. This finding persists under different
levels of uncertainty and after the motives and strategy of the messenger is
highlighted. At the individual level, many people treat biased and unbiased
information similarly, with only a small fraction recognizing the additional
informational value of biased information. A larger fraction of individuals
respond to bias by somewhat disregarding the information, even though all
revealed information in the experiment was truthful. Finally, cognitive cost
may play a key role in explaining the deficiencies in voters’ decision-making.
I find that decisions in rounds requiring less mental effort are significantly
better, though still far from rational.
Taken together, this suggests that individuals in cognitively-demanding
real-world settings are likely to be persuaded by biased information, even
without the influence of deception and emotion-based persuasion strategies.
Common interventions, such as the declaration competing interests, are also
unlikely to fully mitigate the impact. Finally, the tendency of some indi-
viduals to irrationally treat truthful information from biased sources as less
informative, coupled with the intuitive appeal of this approach as a low effort
strategy, has implications that extend to many domains, including politics.
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Chapter 4
Collusion: A Prosocial Activity
Collusion promises rents exceeding those available when misbehaving alone.
Though the belief that “one rotten apple spoils the barrel” is widespread,
the experimental study of ethically questionable behavior, such as cheating,
has focused on individuals in isolation. Collusion, which is how I will refer
to collaborative unethical behavior, has received less attention, despite the
temptation and threat that collusion among insiders poses to organizations.
In this paper, I look at simple games of tacit collusion in which cheaters
receive positively correlated outcomes for themselves, but which create ex-
ternalities.
To study collusion, I presented a hypothetical scenario based on a
sequential-play laboratory experiment to 282 US-based participants, who
were separated into five main collusion treatments and two individual con-
trols. By comparing treatments, I ask whether the willingness to collude is
enhanced or dulled when there are negative effects to others, either concen-
trated or diffuse, whether willingness increase with others’ participation (so-
cial contagion), and how behavior depends on order of play. At an individual
level, the main question is whether more prosocial subjects, as measured with
a dictator game, make decisions consistent with simple calculations based on
the distribution of payoffs. Control treatments qualitatively matched choices
made in laboratory experiments.
When following the lead of a cheater, I find that aggregate collusion is not
significantly mitigated by the consequences to others, but strongly affected
by the number of members cheating. Increasing the number of preceding
cheaters from one to two increases subject collusion dramatically (from 44%
to 72%). As in similar laboratory studies, approximately half of all subjects
expressed a preference for truthfulness in other treatments.
At an individual level, dictator game preferences predict willingness to
collude in both small and larger groups. With only one other cheater, more
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altruistic subjects tended to be truthful relative to their more selfish peers.
They were also more sensitive to the group size. More selfish players colluded
at similar rates across treatments (around 70%), while other-regarding were
less collusive in the smaller group (around 30%), and about as willing as their
more selfish peers (60%) in the larger setting. This pattern helps explain the
aggregate-level indifference to others’ consequences in the smaller group set-
tings: subjects most likely to respond to others’ gains or losses with reduced
cheating were also significantly less likely to collude in the first place. Other
variables, such as age, gender or religiosity, were not significant once social
preferences had been accounted for.
Finally, order had a strong impact on collusion, both in aggregate and
individually. Thirty eight (19%) cheating individuals switched to honesty
when they were asked to initiate, while only one switched from honesty to
collusion, so that, overall, in every treatment fewer subjects were willing to
collude when deciding first. To my knowledge this is the first study to look
explicitly at the importance of sequence in deception.
This study complements literature looking at collusion through labora-
tory experiments (Weisel and Shalvi, 2015; Wouda et al., 2017; Shalvi and
De Dreu, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013). Weisel and Shalvi (2015) in particular,
uses a sequential die-rolling task on which I derive my design. They find that
pairs of subjects in a repeated setting were far more likely to report matching
die rolls, earning them a profit, than subjects reporting alone for the same
material incentives. Wouda et al. (2017) replicated the result, albeit with
lower rates of collusion. Conrads et al. (2013) had subject pairs play a simul-
taneous one-shot die-rolling task. They also found that pairs lied more than
individuals, concluding that diffusion of responsibility was a more plausible
explanation than a motive to increase partner payoffs.
Relative to the literature on collusion, the literature on lying, cheating,
and deception on which experimental studies of collusion have built upon is
fairly extensive (Gneezy (2005); Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013); Mazar
et al. (2008); Gneezy et al. (2018); Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017); Cappelen
et al. (2013); Schurr and Ritov (2016) see Rosenbaum et al. (2014) for an ex-
tensive review of literature prior to 2013). Two protocols in particular have
seen wide use among economists. Gneezy (2005) is a seminal study of lying
in economics, using a sender-receiver game to explore lying aversion and its
response to incentives. Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) introduced the
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widely used die-rolling tasks, where a subject’s own report of a private die
roll is used to determine payoffs, typically resulting in payoffs far greater
than would be expected by chance, but more honesty and partial lies (non-
maximizing reports) than predicted by rational models. Behavior in these
two games share similarities, in particular a significant proportion of players
who do not lie, but also differences in terms of subject responsiveness to in-
centives, possibly due to concerns over being caught Kajackaite and Gneezy
(2017). Behavior in these two tasks are sometimes distinguished as lying in
the sender-receiver game, and cheating in the die-rolling task. I use these
terms interchangeably when referring to behavior in my experiment. My re-
sults suggest that a widely observed pattern of “types” (e.g. never lie, always
lie, and partial liars) in deception games are correlated with distributional
preferences.
A number of theories have been developed to explain patterns of lying in
these games and unethical behavior witnessed in the laboratory more gen-
erally (Gneezy et al., 2018; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017; Cappelen et al.,
2013; Schurr and Ritov, 2016). The most basic of these models lying as a sim-
ple cost Kartik (2009), sometimes allowing for distinct types Hurkens and
Kartik (2009), or invoking convexity to explain partial lying in die-rolling
tasks (Lundquist et al., 2009). Expanding on this literature, a number of
studies have found support for the idea of moral-balancing – that subjects
desire to offset their own bad behavior with good behavior – or the idea of
self-concept maintenance Gino et al. (2013); Shalvi et al. (2015); Ploner and
Regner (2013); Erat and Gneezy (2012); Mazar et al. (2008). For example, in
both Gino et al. (2013) and Erat and Gneezy (2012), subjects are willing to
lie if it will benefit others, even if costly to themselves. The immediate (Gino
et al., 2009; Keizer et al., 2008) and background (Gächter and Schulz, 2016)
attitudes towards norm violating behavior have also been found to be influ-
ential, and more recent theories pay special attention to the importance of
how people wish to be perceived by others Gneezy et al. (2018); Dufwenberg
and Dufwenberg (2016).
In a larger sense, my findings suggest that individual willingness to partake
in bad behavior decreases rapidly as more people adopt it, possibly after
even small increases in prevalence. This is mitigated by a general aversion
to collusion and unethical behavior, especially when acting first and possibly
alone, with prosocial preferences correlating with the level of initial aversion.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
design, followed by the data and results, after which I offer a brief discussion
and conclude.
Experimental Design
One of the main objectives of this study is to assess how a person’s willing-
ness to collude depends on how others are affected. To that end, the ex-
perimental design revolves around thought experiments in which the subject
decides whether or not to commit to a lie, even as others are affected. De-
signed to parallel situations in which tacit collusion might arise, the scenarios
present one-shot variations of the die-in-cup task developed in Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and extended in Weisel and Shalvi (2015).
Each subject is exposed to one of seven treatments. In each treatment,
subjects are asked to imagine a scenario in which their earnings depend on
the reported results of a private die roll. Hypothetical other players may also
be involved, depending on the treatment, with earnings likewise influenced.
The text of a representative scenario is below:
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
two people earn depends on their roll of the dice.
Specifically, each person rolls a die, one after the other. If
together they roll a double (where both dice yield the same num-
ber), then an award of ten times the type of double is given to
each, from $10 each for a pair of ones to $60 each for a pair of
sixes. If the dice do not yield a double, then no money is awarded.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result. The first person announces their result before the second
person rolls.
Suppose the first person reports rolling a six. If you are the
second person, what number would you report?
The subjects choose from a menu of seven possibilities: Truth, One (or a
pair of ones for one-player scenarios), up to Six (or a pair of sixes for one-
player scenarios). The material consequences for each choice are also stated.
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For example, the option reads ”Two (both of you get nothing)” or ”Six (both
of you get $60)” for those respective choices in the scenario above.
Treatments
As noted above, I ran seven treatments. Collectively, they allow the study of
three specific questions relating to collusion and social preferences: whether
the benefit to others makes collusion more attractive, whether salient losses to
others deter collusion, and whether the participation of others, aside from the
material gains, is critical. Framed another way, these treatments allow me to
examine whether the moral calculus of collusion is simply an accounting for
either narrow or broader material consequences, or if a higher order notion
of collusion is involved.
Hereafter, I refer to die-rollers as “insiders” and passive others as “out-
siders.” Insiders precede the player and report a six, as “brazen” liars (Weisel
and Shalvi, 2015). Table 4.1 summarizes the various treatments in terms of
the number of insiders (including the subject), outsiders, and the material
consequences of collusion on outsiders.
The text for the baseline Collusion treatment (II) appears above. Two die-
rollers (insiders) determine the outcome. This is a game of tacit collusion
– the circumstances and context suggest that the other player’s report of
six is suspicious, but there is no other communication. Since the larger
question of this research concerns the early formation of collusion among
insiders, the relatively “safe” behavior exhibited here is more suitable than
outright discussion. Note also that subjects’ actions are always decisive.
(Mis)reporting a six is collusion, reporting honestly is passive, and reporting
a number other than six is a rejection of collusion, arguably a moral lie.
Collusion among insiders can cause harm, so two treatments, Diffuse (IID)
and Concentrated (IIC), explicitly states the loss to others (outsiders). In
IID, collusion results in a $0.60 loss to each of one hundred outsiders. In
IIC, that $60 loss is sustained by a single outsider. I hypothesize that IIC,
with its extremely unfair negative outcome, will deter collusion, even though
the total payout is the same as IID. On the other hand, it is less clear how
II compares with IID. Although a general preference for efficiency exists,



























































































































































































































the idea that the negative consequences of collusion are negligible.
To understand whether the rate of unethical collusion is itself a function of
the level of collusion, in effect, how easily collusion turns into contagion (Gino
et al., 2009), Contagion (III) asks subjects for their report after two other
insiders have reported a six. Subjects are told that only matching triplets will
result in a payoff, so in this scenario a dishonest report of six would yield a
payoff of $60 for three insiders. Control III (IIG), featuring only two insiders
(including the subject) but one passive outsider, controls for the change in
payoffs in III. Under the hypothesis that increased collusion is primarily a
function of distributional preferences, collusion in both III and IIG should be
similar. Likewise, if a simple calculus of payoffs is determining collusion, then
both III and IIG should show greater collusion that II. By contrasting with
II, IIG may also inform on the impact of positive externalities on collusion.
Solo (Solo) and Solo Gain (SoloG) provide useful controls and points of
comparison with existing laboratory experiments. In Solo, subjects simply
decide whether they would intentionally report a pair (from one through six),
or report honestly, with similar hypothetical payoffs as above ($10 through
$60 or nothing). This treatment compares to both Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013) and Weisel and Shalvi (2015). SoloG is similar, but with a
passive outsider receiving a matching payoff. Unlike the other treatments,
the consequences of subjects’ lies are not binary, so recognized patterns from
existing studies, such as partial lying (reporting less than a pair of six),
substantial levels of honesty (as high as 39% in Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013), though for lower stakes), responsiveness to altruistic incentives
(Erat and Gneezy (2012)), and some evidence of types of lying preferences,
whether always honest (infinite lying cost), always maximizing (zero lying
cost), or some intermediate level.
Influential vs. Decisive Additionally, subjects in scenarios with more
than two die-rollers are presented with a second question, with similar op-
tions, after answering the first:
Suppose instead that you are the first person to roll. What
number would you report?
Contrasted with reporting after others, the first insider is not under overt
pressure to collude, but, while not decisive, they can still restrict the payoffs
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by lying. One might imagine, too, that a person interested in signaling col-
lusion would choose a six, while a selfishly profit-maximizing player might
even calculate that, in a world of partial liars, a five or lower might find
more willing conspirators. Although not thoroughly explored in this study,
responses to this question, which gets to the heart of how collusion is ini-
tiated, are potentially enticing. How subjects will behave is ambiguous. If
the subjective cost of dishonesty is similar between going first or last, the
lower guaranteed benefits predicts that people will generally be more hon-
est when going first. Subjects may be more willing to lie under these less
determined circumstances, however, if the subjective cost of lying is itself a
function of the consequences (e.g. convex in outcome, c.f. Kajackaite and
Gneezy 2017), if not being decisive reduces feelings of guilt (Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, 2007).
Modified Dictator Game After completing the scenario task, subjects
complete a modified dictator game by ranking three allocations. Subjects are
told to imagine that they have the opportunity to allocate money between
them and an anonymous other. They respond by ranking three allocations.
One allocation splits funds equally ($5, $5), in another the subject receives
more ($8, $2). In the third allocation, the other person receives more, but
the total funds are greater ($5, $7). The ranking of these options provides
insight into a subject’s relative valuation of distributional equity, efficiency
(total welfare), and own-payoff (Charness and Rabin, 2002).
Demographics questionnaire Before finishing the survey, subjects an-
swer questions relating to their gender, age, whether they were native English
speakers, their political and economic preferences, and religiosity. Political
and economic preferences were solicited by asking ”How politically liberal or
conservative are you?” followed by seven-point scales for social and economic
preferences. For religiosity, subjects were asked ”How important is religion
in your daily life?” followed by a five-point scale.
Strengths and weaknesses
There are several advantages of this design, and one clear disadvantage.
Among the advantages, these scenarios are similar to those run in labo-
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ratory experiments, so a point of comparison to existing research is clear.
However, unlike those experiments, whether a subject chooses to misreport
is directly observed. As I will show, this enables the detection of other behav-
iors that would otherwise be overlooked, in particular moral lies, a form of
lying to disadvantage (Utikal and Fischbacher, 2013). Basing these scenarios
on a simple, uncomplicated task also avoids the problem of subjects being
persuaded by imagined elements that might crop up when more elaborate,
realistic contexts are provided.
Also, in some ways the moral aspect of the decision is clearer here than
in laboratory settings. When student subjects misreport in the typical lab-
oratory experiments of deception, it is not clear that subjects perceive a
moral conflict. In the laboratory setting, with no clear social cost to mis-
reporting, subjects may perceive the experiment as an intelligence test, or
whether social norms sometimes override common sense. Some subjects may
perceive lying as a positive signal, then. There is, in short, an uncontrolled
experimenter’s demand effect in the laboratory (Zizzo, 2010). In my study,
ambiguity is reduce and the moral aspect of the choice was emphasized before
introducing the scenario, with the line: Sometimes, people may be tempted
to misreport information, such as when filing their tax returns.
Finally, this scenario is flexible enough to simply present scenarios involv-
ing losses and gains, with equal credibility, which again aids in subject com-
prehension of the task. Collusion is viewed negatively because of the resulting
harm that directly or indirectly befalls others, yet imposing appreciable losses
in laboratory settings is challenging. Despite the free reign afforded to me by
the use of hypothetical scenarios, however, gains and losses were limited to
$60, under the presumption that this amount would be viewed as attractive,
but not extraordinary. I further presumed that the smaller amounts typical
of laboratory experiments with student subjects would be insufficient to the
point of distraction.
The main disadvantage of my design is the lack of incentives. Although the
necessity of incentives is not always clear (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999), pre-
sumably in a study of collusion subjects would be tempted to feign honesty.
I attempt to mitigate these temptations by recruiting and paying relatively
anonymously through Mechanical Turk, an online labor marketplace. An-
other important control is the inclusion of scenarios that are analogs of lab-
oratory experiments, enabling direct comparison with established research.
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Procedure
Data were collected in June 2017 through an online survey implemented in
Qualtrics. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) and were restricted, via AMT’s filters, to US subjects with 100+
HITs and a greater than 97% approval rating. Previous research has found
that subjects recruited through AMT performed similarly with respect to
typical laboratory participants (Goodman et al., 2013). Payment was set at
$1 and made through the AMT website. A code given at the end of the
survey was used to verify participation. Subjects were required to enter this
code to collect their earnings.
Participants were assigned randomly to one of seven scenarios, with at-
tempts to balance the number of subjects in each treatment. Due to the
possibility that subjects might see but not complete the survey, or close and
reopen the link, treatments are not perfectly balanced.
Data
A total of 282 participants completed the survey (41% female; mean/median
age = 34.05/31, s.d. = 10.22). According to the demographics questionnaire,
98.58% of the participants consider English to be their native language. On
social issues, on a scale from one to seven, with one indicating most liberal
and seven indicating most conservative, the mean was 3.27, the median was 3,
and the standard deviation was 1.72. For economic issues on the same scale,
the mean was 3.79, the median was four, and the standard deviation was 1.79.
On a five point scale asking if religion was important to the subjects’ daily
lives, with one as least important or non-religious, and five as most important,
the mean was 2.07, the median was one, and the standard devation was 1.39.
Table 4.2 shows the count for each treatment. Based on an analysis of AMT
reports, it is possible that four subjects completed two surveys. Given the
difficulty, if not impossibility of identifying the appropriate survey, the fact
that scenarios were randomly assigned, and the low number, these surveys
are included in all subsequent analyses.
Similarly, as subjects could choose to skip and questions without penalty,
not all questions were answered by all subjects. In total, only four surveys
were incomplete, with two omitting the social issues question, one omitting
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the economics question, and one omitting the question on religiosity. In
general, these responses were included in the analyses, with exceptions noted
as they arise.
Finally, due to a typo, the list of options for scenario IID when rolling
first incorrectly stated that one person would lose the full amount, rather
than 100 people losing a fraction. Since the initial scenario description and
options are correctly phrased; only one subject remarked on the typo; and
the results are in line with those in other questions; data for this question is
analyzed without special treatment.
Results
The results of the main task are summarized in Table 4.2.
Commenting on the overall results, the most striking finding is the high
level of collusion in the Contagion (III) treatment relative to others, seem-
ingly at the expense of status-quo truthfulness. I rule out altruistic motives
as an explanation for the sharp increase, as subjects in the IIG control treat-
ment colluded significantly less and at a level similar to the no-outsider II
treatment. In fact, II, IIG, IID, and IIC share similar levels of collusion,
suggesting that the material consequences to others, gains or losses, played
a small role in subjects’ decision to collude. One interesting caveat is in the
case of IIC, however. In IIC, significantly more subjects rejected collusion
(misreport to lose) so as not to impose a large cost on a single outsider. In all
treatments, a substantial portion of respondents chose what might be con-
sidered the status quo and reported honestly, neither accepting nor outright
rejecting collusion.
I also asked subjects how they would respond to the scenarios if they
reported first instead of last. Here, subjects were less eager to initiate. The
proportion of truthful reports is higher when subjects lead in every treatment
with two or more insiders. Within-subject comparison reveals that, for all
subjects save one, the increase in truthful reporting is due to switching by
those who chose collude when in the final, decisive position.
Finally, there is no evidence that the thought experiment format impugns
the experiment’s validity; when direct comparisons were available, the results
qualitatively match incentivized lab experiments.
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The remainder of this section goes through these results in detail, along
with individual-level analyses.
Table 4.2: Collected Results
Treatment N Colludea Truthful Moral Lie
Collusion (II) 41 43.9% (7.8%) 53.7% 2.4%
Diffuse (IID) 39 53.8% (8.0%) 38.5% 7.7%
Concentrated (IIC) 40 37.5% (7.7%) 45.0% 17.5%
Contagion (III) 43 72.1% (6.8%) 18.6% 9.3%
Control (IIG) 39 48.7% (8.0%) 43.6% 7.7%
Individual (Solo) 42 64.3% (7.4%) 35.7% -
Solo w/ Gain (SoloG) 38 60.5% (7.9%) 39.5% -
a Standard errors (assuming a binary choice) in parentheses.
Tacit collusion and the cost to outsiders In the benchmark Collusion
(II) treatment, subjects are asked whether they would lie after another person
reports a six. As mentioned above, I classify subjects’ decisions as collusion if
they choose to lie by reporting a six, a moral lie if they choose to lie but report
another number, and truthful if they chose that option. In II, 43.9% were
willing to collude, only 2.4% directly rejected collusion, and 53.7% reported
truthfully. That roughly half of all subjects choose to be truthful is similar
to results in other experiments. The positive, but low, proportion of subjects
who reject collusion offer intriguing evidence of lies that materially cost the
subject. One plausible reason for such behavior is that a one might feel
morally obligated to counteract previous lies, perhaps as punishment. Such
an obligation would more than offset any psychological cost of lying.
Real-life collusion is typically not a Pareto improving activity, and IID
and IIC introduce the idea of outsiders who suffer losses as a result of insider
collusion. Socially motivated colluders, who lie partly to benefit the welfare
of other insiders and are indifferent to insider/outsider status, should collude
less when others are negatively impacted.
However, this does not occur. Subjects in the diffuse, IID condition collude
at higher rates (53.8%; χ21 = 0.79; p = 0.374) than in II and choose the
truthful status-quo less often, though not significantly so (38.5%; χ21 = 1.86;
p = 0.173). Moral lying is higher, as one might predict if social preferences
dominate, but not significant (7.7%; χ21 = 1.16; p = 0.281). The overall
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Figure 4.1: The benchmark Collusion treatment compared to treatments in
which collusion also results in losses to outsiders. The level of collusion (left
bar for each group) is not significantly different between any pair of
treatments. When a single outsider bears a large loss, however, the number
of moral lies is significantly higher than in the Collusion treatment, though
not significantly higher than in the Diffuse Loss treatment.
distribution of responses in IID is also not significantly different from II
(χ22 = 2.51; p = 0.285). Concentrating the loss on one outsider also did
not reduce collusion significantly (37.5%; χ21 = 0.34; p = 0.558), or increase
truthful reporting (45.0%; χ21 = 0.61; p = 0.436).
Significantly more subjects did, however, reject collusion when the losses
were concentrated. 17.5% (χ21 = 5.16; p = 0.023) decided to forego personal
gain for themselves and fellow insider to avoid imposing a hefty loss on an-
other. This is the highest level of rejection across the five collusion treatments
(excluding the solo controls), and seven times the proportion of moral lies in
II (though the difference with other treatments is closer to two-fold). It is
worth mentioning that such behavior would likely go undetected under stan-
dard laboratory implementations of deception, where lying is only inferred
in the aggregate. Overall, the distribution of choices in IIC is significantly
different from II at only the 10% level (χ22 = 5.16; p = 0.076).
In both IID and IIC the overall payout is the same under collusion, with
personal gains offset by outsider losses, but insiders’ net gains outstripping
outsiders’ losses.
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Figure 4.2: Contagion (III) elicits significantly higher willingness to collude
than either the benchmark Collusion treatment (p < 0.01) or the Control
(p < 0.05) treatment, which controls the number of beneficiaries. The
increase in collusion is drawn primarily from people who would otherwise
report truthfully; truth-tellers are significantly higher in both the Collusion
(p < 0.01) and Control (p < 0.01). The proportion rejecting collusion,
however, is not significantly different. Although the subject is decisive in all
three treatments, in the Contagion treatment the subject reports after two
others report, compared to the Control where only one other reports.
Contagion One concern with unethical behavior is that its spread increases
as insider membership grows. Prosocial attitudes, such as altruism, narrowly
viewed, offer a channel through which collusion might transform into conta-
gion. Treatments III, IIG, and II allow us to examine whether the tendency
to collude increases with membership and, if so, whether the benefits to oth-
ers makes colluding easier. These treatments are compared directly in Figure
4.2.
In fact, collusion in III far exceeds other treatments. 72.1% of subjects in
the III condition chose to collude, significantly more than in II (χ21 = 6.86;
p = 0.009). The difference is due to a significant drop in truthful reports,
which fell to 18.6% (χ21 = 11.23; p < 0.001), the lowest level across all
treatments. Active rejection is not significantly higher (9.3%; χ21 = 1.77;
p = 0.184), but III overall is distributed significantly differently from II (χ22 =
11.74; p = 0.003). Since the willingness to conclude is substantially higher
after adding one more insider also colluding, and since counteracting behavior
like active rejection does not also increase, I conclude that “contagion” —an
acceleration in the spread of unethical behavior —is possible.
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If the reason for an increase in collusion stems from the increasing number
of beneficiaries, one would expect to see similar levels of collusion in the
IIG treatment, which has the same number of beneficiaries (3) but fewer
insiders. However, just as losses do not seem to persuade people to collude
less, the promise of benefits to outsiders does not lead to increased collusion.
In IIG, collusion is only 48.7%, which is not significantly different from the
II condition (χ21 = 0.19; p = 0.666), and, as anticipated by the earlier results,
the distribution of IIG is not significantly different from II (χ22 = 1.62; p =
0.445). Compared to III, subjects in IIG collude significantly less (χ21 = 4.70;
p = 0.030) and lie significantly more (43.6%; χ21 = 6.02; p = 0.014). So, I
reject the null that an increased tendency to collude when more insiders
participate is due primarily to a narrow altruism to reward an increased
number of beneficiaries.
A number of other plausible reasons to collude are introduced in treatment
III. For example, subjects may not wish to be the only ones lying. Since there
is no other communication, motives of the other player is uncertain. Despite
the language used in the treatment, subjects may allow for the possibility
that high reports are due to chance. Increasing the number of reported
sixes reduces this uncertainty. Adding a third insider may also help shape
the social norm, as now a clear majority may be thought of as wanting to
collude. If people feel strongly about not appearing, even to themselves,
as behaving unusually unethically (Gneezy et al., 2018), colluding with a
clear majority may greatly reduce the psychological cost and hence, any
personal inhibitions. Since a contagion-like spread of unethical behavior has
potentially serious implications, further research is warranted.
Leading versus Following Subjects in one of the five partnered treat-
ments were asked how they would report if, instead of reporting last and
decisively, they reported first and influentially. Data therefore permit within
subject comparison.
Figure 4.3 compares behavior in each treatment by order. Respondents
were less willing to lie when rolling first. Dishonest reporting when leading
is lower across each partner treatment, and significantly lower overall (40.1%
versus 60.4%; χ21 = 15.842;p = 0.000). Of the dishonest respondents, most
of them would choose to lie by reporting a six, which maximizes the possible
gains for the group and potentially signals subsequent voters. A sizeable
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Figure 4.3: Empirical cumulative distribution functions, with truthful
reporting on the left, for each of the five collusion treatments. Truthful
reporting is higher when leading (initiating) than following (decisive) in all
treatments.
minority (8.9%, or 19 subjects) chose to lie by reporting an intermediate
level, with a median report of three.
This partial lying appears to be of two distinct types. 13 of the 19 subjects
intentionally misreporting a value under six also actively rejected collusion
(χ21 = 83.592; p = 0.000), and chose fairly low values (mean = 2.85; median
= 3; mode = 3). Perhaps, expecting subsequent players to lie, they thought
to limit their earnings. The remaining six, who colluded in the decisive role,
chose higher numbers to misreport (mean = 4.83; median = 5, mode =
5). Possibly these were efforts to appear less greedy or blatant in order to
strategically persuade others. They might also be optimal choices of persons
facing convex lying costs.
Control treatments A potential problem with this design is that sub-
jects are not incentivized. It may be that subjects respond randomly, or in a
more honest manner than they would with incentives. However, treatments
similar to Solo and SoloG have been conducted as incentivized laboratory ex-
periments before, so that it is possible to validate my results against familiar
benchmarks.
A robust finding of individual behavior in deception games is the presence
of three main types of play (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Rosenbaum
et al., 2014). While many unsurprisingly maximize their payoff, a substantial
number of subjects appear to respond truthfully (inferred to be up to 35% in
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)). In die-rolling tasks, this proportion
of honest players is not strongly influenced by incentives. A third group,
which is more responsive to incentives, are “partial liars” that report a result
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Figure 4.4: Comparing solo choice with and without a passive beneficiary
shows how honesty does not significantly change, but lies tend to increase.
More liars maximize the payoffs when there is a outsider beneficiary
compared to the individual treatment, suggesting moral balancing.
that is neither truthful, nor maximizes payoffs. One common interpretation
of this behavior is that the cost of lying is convex in the payoffs.
In the current study, 35.71% of subjects in the Solo treatment said they
would report truthfully, 38.10% said they would lie and maximize their pay-
offs, and the remaining 26.19% would partially lie. This compares favorably
to proportions, and at a minimum rules out the possibility that most subjects
would self-report truthful behavior to appear better in the anonymous task.
Studies with outside beneficiaries have found that unethical actions in-
crease, possibly because people engage in moral balancing and feel less guilty
when others also benefit (Gino et al., 2013). The distribution of responses
in SoloG, which includes an outsider that receives payoffs equal to the sub-
ject, is consistent with these findings. Though the proportion of truth-telling
subjects is actually slightly higher (39.47%; χ21 = 0.12; p = 0.729), misre-
porting subjects choose significantly higher values (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
U = 224, p = 0.017, two-sided). Partial lying is most extinguished in SoloG,
with 86.96% of lies maximizing payoffs (for an average of $56.52), compared
to only 59.26% ($50) in Solo. The unresponsiveness of truthful reporters is
also consistent with findings in other deception games, though not always in
other games measuring lying or unethical behavior. A comparison of these
two treatments is presented in Figure 4.4
Finally, treatment II closely resembles a one-shot version of the Aligned
84
Outcomes treatment in Weisel and Shalvi (2015). Besides the difference
in incentives, a perfect comparison is made difficult by the fixed matching
scheme. However, when comparing only first round play when the initial
player reported a six, twelve out of sixteen subjects chose to collude across
both initial and replication treatments (their Fig. S10 and Fig. S24). This
is a significantly higher level of collusion than in my treatment II (43.9%;
χ21 = 4.46; p = 0.035). Furthermore, this far exceeds the number of maximal
payoffs awarded in their individual treatment, while colluding subjects in
II are present in similar proportion to profit-maximizers in Solo (43.9% vs.
38.1%). However, although my results in II differ from the Aligned Outcomes
treatment, these differences are difficult to ascribe to the lack of incentives.
As evident in Solo and SoloG, behavior in the thought experiments varies sys-
tematically to scenario elements. Rather than incentives, my results suggest
that other factors present in the Aligned Outcomes sessions may be crucial
to engendering collusion, such as the fixed matching scheme, repeated play,
and dynamic interaction with individuals in the same physical space. I also
note that while Wouda et al. (2017) broadly replicated the main result of
Weisel and Shalvi (2015), the effect sizes were smaller, which may also help
explain why I did not see a large increase in second-player lying.
Overall, my results are qualitatively similar to those from experiments
conducting for incentives in laboratory settings. That, along with the consis-
tency of behavior across treatments, suggest that results of the current study
are not entirely due to chance.
Individual analysis
One might wonder which sort of individual characteristics predict the afore-
mentioned behaviors. In this section, conduct individual-level analyses using
post-task survey data, the primary objective of which is to identify char-
acteristics which predict willingness to collude, especially in the contagion
condition. Moral liars, who intentionally ensured zero payoffs for all, were
too small in number to analyze properly at the individual level, though results
of that analysis may be found in the appendix. I restricted the analysis to
participants in the five collusion treatments, thus excluding Solo and SoloG,
where decisions do not involve collusion. In addition, two subjects left por-
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tions of the survey incomplete and were excluded, leaving 200 subjects in the
sample.
Table 4.3: Individual characteristics
N 200
Demographic
Gender (0 = Male) 119 Male 81 Female
Age Mean = 33.74 S.d. = 10.25
Native English? Yes 98.5% No 1.5%
Social attitudes Mean S.d.
Political issues (7 = Conservative) 3.29 1.74
Economic issues (7 = Conservative) 3.83 1.79
Con (7 = Conservative) 3.56 1.64
Religion (5 = Very important) 2.08 1.43
Social preferences Mean S.d.
SelfS 1.1 0.86
FairS 1.16 0.86
Welfare maximizing (SWMS) 0.74 0.64
Table 4.3 summarizes the individual characteristics included in the anal-
yses, which can be separated into three main categories: demographic vari-
ables, social attitudes and religiosity, and measures of social preferences.
Participants were older than typical student samples on average, with more
males. Almost all subjects self-identified as native English speakers. For so-
cial attitudes, I asked subjects if they were politically conservative on social
and economic issues. Average conservatism on social and economic issues
were slightly liberal and highly correlated, so the average of these scores
was coded as the composite variable, Con. Religiosity, as a response to the
question, “How important is religion in your daily life?” was fairly low.
Correlations among these variables and age are included in Table 4.4.
The mini-dictator game allows me to infer subjects’ social preferences. I
coded SelfS, FairS, and SWMS according to how they ranked the associated
allocated. For example, FairS is coded as a 2 if a subject most-preferred an
allocation of ($5, $5), and SWMS is coded a 1 if the next most-preferred
is the allocation ($5, $7), where $5 goes to the subject. In this example,
the remaining, least-preferred allocation is ($8, $2), so SelfS is coded as 0.
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Table 4.4: Correlation: Social attitudes with age
Age Political Economic Religion
Age 1 0.170 0.177 0.168
Political 0.170 1 0.730 0.500
Economic 0.177 0.730 1 0.316
Religion 0.168 0.500 0.316 1
Note that, since ties were not permitted, these three variables are perfectly
collinear. Overall, fairness and self-interest were evenly split and strongly
negatively correlated (r = −0.72). Subjects ranked the allocation ($5, $5)
highest 46.5% of the time, with ($8, $2) close behind at 42.5%. The overall
payoff maximizing outcome, ($5, $7), was rarely most-preferred (11%), but
was usually the next-preferred option, at 52%, and also least preferred (37%).
In contrast, the selfish option was second- and third-best for 25% and 32.5%
of subjects, respectively, while the fair option was second- and third-best 23%
and 30.5% of the time, respectively. Table B.1 shows the pair-wise correlation
between social preference dimensions.
Individual characteristics of colluders In this section I attempt to
characterize individuals and motives of people who collude after others have
reported. My strategy is to apply a logistic regression of a binary variable
(GainLie = 1 if subject reports six) on successive expansions of individual re-
gressors, starting with treatment variables, then proceeding to demographic
variables and attitude measures, and finally ending with social preferences.
Models are decided according to their Akaike information criterion, which
penalizes extra regressors, yet doesn’t require each regressor to be statisti-
cally significant. This second part is especially critical when evaluating social
preferences, which are collinear. Results are reported in similar fashion, with
the best model at each phase reported.
Table 4.5 presents the result of this analysis. Consistent with the analysis
of aggregate behavior in treatments, two-insider treatments did not elicit sig-
nificantly different levels of collusion from subjects, and the best fitting model
(One) contains only an indicator for the three-insider contagion treatment,
which predicts higher collusion (72%, compared to 45% in two-insider treat-
ments, in this case). Of demographic information, only age and a squared
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term improve the model fit (Model Two), and even then only slightly, with
older participants slightly less likely to report a six. Both gender and native-
speaker indicators are not predictive (not shown). Including social attitudes
slightly improves the model. Religiosity, in particular, is significant and im-
proves both the importance and significance of age (Model Three. Interacting
religion and age does not improve the fit). Older, more religious individuals
were less likely to collude. On the other hand, political and economic con-
servatism, while correlated with both age and religiosity, do not improve the
model.
Results from the treatment comparisons show that payoffs to others do
not seem to drive aggregate collusion, but social preferences may still pro-
vide insights into why subjects are more or less willing to collude. Results
controlling for social preferences are shown in column four, with the FairS
variable serving as the omitted type. Comparing the AIC, it is clear that ac-
counting for social preferences leads to an improvement in the model that far
exceeds the contributions of both demographic and social attitudes, with the
improvement over the previous model (nearly thirteen points) over double the
improvement of the best social-attitudes-plus-age model over the treatment-
variable-only benchmark. Age is no longer a meaningful contributor, and
though religion improves model fit as measured by AIC, it is not significant
at even the 10% level.
Most striking in this analysis is the sharp difference between more self-
interested subjects and their fair- and welfare-minded peers. The model
predicts that an otherwise average subject who most-prefers ($8, $2) in the
dictator game would collude 63% in two-insider games, and 84% in the Con-
tagion treatment. In contrast, such a subject who least-preferred that option,
and who most likely chooses the fair outcome of ($5, $5), would collude only
26% of the time in two-insider scenarios, and 53% in the Contagion treatment.
In the actual data, the proportions were 67% and 76% for self-interested sub-
jects, compared to 32% and 60% for those that were inequity-averse.
This result, however, seems to contradict the earlier finding that the impact
on others doesn’t significantly impact aggregate collusion. One reason might
be that, since relatively few other-regarding subjects collude in general, the
number that might be deterred from collusion by the impact on others is
small. More self-interested types collude more readily, but are also less likely
to be negatively affected by others’ outcomes.
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Why, though, should social preferences predict collusion? One possibility
is that subjects expressing non-selfish preferences feel that collusion or lying
is simply wrong, and the cost of participating in profitable deception is quite
high. Just as lying is considering morally inferior to honesty, being fair,
or even generous, is perceived as morally superior to being selfish. Another
possibility is that a social norm exists that around both honesty and fairness,
so that the fair or generous options in a dictator game are preferred because
of social norms, or even conformity, and collusion is avoided for the same
reason. Under these preferences, the cost of collusion is strongly dependent
on social norms. A crude test of these conflicting motives is available in the
current data, by comparing behavior in the Contagion treatment according
to social preferences. Under a simple social norms hypothesis, self-interested
subjects should be less influenced by the behavior of other insiders. Others,
however, would be more willing to collude if more people were also doing so.
Column five presents the results of this analysis. Using the measure of
self-interest as the interaction term yielded the best fitting model, which
slightly improves on the previous model without an interaction term. The
interaction itself is negative and significant at the 10% level (p = 0.06),
weakly confirming the conjecture that fragile social norms (or conformity)
at least partly contribute to subjects’ unwillingness to collude. Under this
final model, self-interested subjects collude at similar levels: 66% in the
two-insider case and 74% with three. Inequity-averse subjects, however, are
extremely sensitive to the change, rarely colluding with two insiders (22%),
but nearly as frequently as self-interested subjects in Contagion (69%).
Finally, although one might expect that subjects with different attitudes
towards others might respond differently when outsiders loss or gain, prefer-
ences, interaction terms between preferences and treatment indicators were
not significant. As outlined above, it may be that payoffs to outsiders do
affect willingness to collude differently according to different groups, but the
data are insufficient to detect these smaller variations. Similarly, other terms,












































































































































































































































































































One might imagine that tacit collusion is an important channel through which
corrupt attitudes are entrenched. Although a rational perspective predicts
more rampant norm violation, the social nature of humans provides ambigu-
ous direction. On one hand, humans care about other humans, especially
those they feel close to, and might collude in order to benefit others. On the
other, caring about others plausibly accompanies moral strictures against
such behavior.
Social preferences, narrowly described as caring about the well-being of
others, are one of most well-established phenomena of behavioral economics,
and are implicated in many primitive human interactions, from child-rearing
to cooperation. One natural conjecture is that social preferences might con-
tribute to unethical cooperation as well. In this experiment, however, the
results point to a complex, but secondary role for social preferences in deter-
mining a subjects’ decision to collude. Lying, either to actively participate or
reject collusion, is generally distasteful, with approximately half the respon-
dents choosing to be truthful in the two insider scenarios, and the proportion
of subjects willing to collude in these two-insider treatments was resistant to
payoff effects on outsiders.
Since the size of the putative incentives ($60) were fairly large, it is possible
that subjects were of an always-honest type, a common finding in one player
deception tasks (Rosenbaum et al., 2014; Gneezy et al., 2013), even when
lying might significantly benefit others (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). My results
suggest that honesty and altruistic tendencies are correlated, as non-colluding
subjects, of which the vast majority responded truthfully, were less likely to
be selfish in the modified dictator game. This contrasts with Weisel and
Shalvi (2015), who do not find a clear connection between deception and
social value orientation in a related die-rolling task, though there deception
could only be indirectly inferred. Their task also differed in that insiders were
matched for repeated play over twenty rounds, with no outsiders, and it is
possible that honesty and social value orientation would be more correlated in
a one-shot setting with clear outsiders. These results are consistent, however,
with Cappelen et al. (2013), who also find that individuals who were more
altruistic in a dictator game were more averse to lying in a sender-receiver
game.
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In a larger sense, my study offers a glimpse into how unethical behavior
might initiate, grow, and normalize within small groups. Taking a typical
labor problem of unverifiable effort as an example, where workers have differ-
ent information about their own and other workers’ efforts than managers.
If I translate the experimental scenarios to such a setting, a worker who is,
to other workers, misreporting the difficulty of a task could, in this manner,
attempt to identify and collude with others. While many would not go along
with the deception, someone else might collude by confirming the inflated
difficulty, effort, hours, or expense. With two insiders in agreement, find-
ing others who are willing to be complicit in such deception would, should
the current results generalize, be substantially easier, with many previously
unwilling workers amenable to the idea, if, as suggested in the analysis, a
local social norm has changed. Of course, it is impossible to know from this
study whether adding a third insider is significant on its own or, for exam-
ple, because it represented the point at which a majority of insiders were
colluding. Nonetheless, taken at face value the main results suggest a sim-
ple social algorithm through which collusion might take root among a small
group of insiders. At an extreme, perceptions of social norms that result
from such processes might lead to unethical behavior in other social settings,
as suggested in Gächter and Schulz (2016).
The current results also indicate important sources of resistance to collu-
sion. First, though people might collude when they are making the decisive
choice, fewer are very willing to initiate, even when the opportunity is avail-
able. The “bad apple” that spoils the bunch is not as common. One reason,
consistent with the findings above, is that the risk of appearing to violate
a norm is greater as others might not join. Perhaps aware of the perils of
blatant initiating, a few of the initiating subjects choose partial lies of four
and five. Although a very small number, such behavior hints at the depth of
reasoning involved in even seemingly risk-free collusion.
Second, there are people who might commit moral lies to foil collusion,
in particular if the material harm is salient and concentrated. Although of-
ten overlooked in the literature on deception (see Utikal and Fischbacher
(2013) for an exception), other studies of norm violation research have es-
tablished a pattern of norm enforcement through altruistic punishment (Fehr
and Gächter, 2002). In the deception literature, the concept of moral bal-
ancing (Gino et al., 2013; Ploner and Regner, 2013; Erat and Gneezy, 2012)
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provides another rationale for why people might be dishonest to prevent suc-
cessful collusion. A caveat accompanying the current study, however, is that
moral lies may be inflated by the lack of incentives and the relative abundance
of choices that are categorized as rejecting collusion. Still, the significant in-
crease in the number of these lies in the concentrated loss treatment provides
some small assurance of the validity of these results.
Besides examining social preferences and collusion, this study also con-
tributes to the experimental literature on lying and deception. The increase
in lying for the Contagion treatment is similar to findings by Weisel and
Shalvi (2015) and Conrads et al. (2013), which find that pairs report higher
values and earn more together when compared to individuals. Neither finds
support for welfare among insiders driving higher reports, and I am able to
tentatively extend that conclusion to the consideration of outsiders, as well,
addressing a natural concern about the cost of unethical behavior. Also,
unlike Weisel and Shalvi (2015), I was able to detect a relationship between
social preferences and willingness to lie that was independent of the mate-
rial consequences. Since these are in principle orthogonal relationships, the
correlation of these preferences might indicate a more fundamental motive,
such as a higher value for social norms or even conformity.
The difference between leading and following, combined with the sharp
increase in lying in the Contagion treatment, seem to point to a more imme-
diate reference point for norms than those in broader society, consistent with
the findings of Gino et al. (2009), with implications for modeling willing-
ness to lie as functions of self-concept or social identity Mazar et al. (2008);
Gneezy et al. (2018); Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2016). As noted earlier,
it is usually assumed that people would not lie to lose money. While this
may still be generally true in one player deception games lacking outsiders,
the array of conflicting motives at work in the realm of deception argue for
some consideration of the possibility. For example, someone worried about
their reputation might intentionally report a losing value, just as some people
reported losing values in my task to limit the harm to outsiders.
My results somewhat contradict previous findings, as well. Although I
found far higher levels of collusion with three insiders, I did not find a sim-
ilar gap between the individual and baseline two-insider treatment found
in Weisel and Shalvi (2015), though, as noted elsewhere, their treatments
involved fixed-matching and repeated play with student subjects in a labo-
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ratory, while mine involved one-shot play with hypothetical persons online.
Besides the difference in repeated play, it may be that reduced social distance
and physical proximity will also predict collusion in these scenarios. If so,
it would be interesting to learn whether collusion results primarily from a
shared notion of welfare, changing norms, or some other factors that influence
social preferences in groups (Chen and Li, 2009).
Finally, although this study is was conducted online and without vary-
ing incentives. Nevertheless, the findings are consistent with broad patterns
for single-roller deception games conducted in laboratory settings. However,
since this is a thought experiment, we can argue that concerns like experi-
menter demand effects are not at play. Nor, probably, is the fear of getting
caught, which in real life is something that is hard to verify. It is not clear
how to reconcile this with Gneezy et al. (2018) or Kajackaite and Gneezy
(2017), who find that subjects lie more and react more to stakes in a Mind
Game, where a private die roll pays if the subject reports that the result
matches a number they imagine. It may be that the Mind Game conveys a
higher permissibility to lying than the die variation, or that subjects in my
task would respond similarly to higher stakes. I also ask people what they
would do beforehand, which may generate subtle differences in behavior; and
it might be better to have instead asked subjects whether they would misre-
port after witnessing a specific die-roll. Still, although never ideal, the cur-
rent study illustrates the feasibility of collecting useful data on lying through
unincentivized tasks.
Regarding the motivational underpinnings of lying, this research, which
interacts lying with ethical and social forces to understand collusion, also
highlights the challenge of characterizing lying, deception, and cheating in
laboratory experiments. As research tends to coalesce around the importance
of psychological factors like social perception or self-image in determining the
costs of lying, my results hint at the complexity involved in developing this
sense. Specifically, self-image, social concept, and social identity, have been
theorized as important factors in determining how people will lie (Gneezy
et al., 2018; Mazar et al., 2008). The elevated dishonesty in Contagion and
the shifting behavior of less selfish subjects is consistent with that literature,
as people react to changes in the group norm. One departure from that lit-
erature, however, is that the reference group is much more immediate than
the more abstract social group usually suggested. Thus, my results suggest
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that identifying the appropriate reference groups and social norms when sub-
jects are faced with ethical choices will be challenging and require extensive
investigation.
Conclusion
This paper discusses results of online thought experiments investigating
whether social preferences encourage or discourage collusion. Although the-
oretically plausible and empirically supported by laboratory experiments,
limitation of measurement and methodology leave the matter unresolved.
Additionally, if true, there have been limited empirical tests of the channels
through which collusion in groups differs from individual misbehavior.
While there are undoubtedly limitations of treatment variety, incentives,
and sample size, results from the current experiment provide some support
that collaborative settings are a risk factor for collusion. However, a cost-
benefit calculus including a regard for the welfare of others, an a priori plau-
sible explanation for the shift in behavior as more collaborators are included,
appears to be rejected, perhaps because of correlation between such prefer-
ences and truthful play. A difference in behavior when initiating and follow-
ing point to the importance of establishing a norm. Altogether, they suggest
a more complex portrait of the interaction between collaboration and the
psychological cost of unethical behavior.
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Appendix A
Supporting material for Chapter 2: Learning
Participants A total of 218 (103 females) undergraduates were recruited
from the Behavioral × Biological Economics and Social Sciences (B2ESS)
Lab at the National University of Singapore. All participants were of ethnic
Han Chinese background and had undergone full genome sequencing. A total
of 217 (103 female) were included in the final analysis after one subject was
excluded due to genotype unavailability.
Procedure Behavioral data was collected from subjects playing the patent
race game in 1-hour sessions of 18–24 subjects. In the patent race game,
programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007), two players take the role of firms
competing to develop a new product. The product is worth a fixed prize
and firms are given an endowment to invest. In the asymmetric version of
the game we used, the prize is worth $10 and the two players begin each
round with endowments of $5 and $4 and are referred to as the “strong” and
“weak” players, respectively.
Players can invest any integer amount from their endowment. The in-
vestments are subtracted from the potential earnings. To win the prize, one
must invest strictly more than the opponent. For example, if the strong
player invests $4 and the weak player invests $2, the payoff that round to the
strong player is $5 − $4 + $10 = $11, while the payoff to the weak player is
$4− $2 = $2. Players’ endowments do not carry over from round to round,
so the maximum investment available is always either $4 (for the weak type)
or $5 (for the strong type).
At the beginning of each round, each player was randomly matched with
a player of the other type. They played 120 rounds in each role, counter-
balanced, for 240 rounds in total. They were fully informed of the rules
and matching procedures. Compensation was equal to 10 Singapore dollars
(SGD) plus either the average earnings per round or 7 SGD, whichever was
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higher.
To illustrate how players can anticipate and respond to the actions of
others in this game, suppose the weak player observes the strong players
frequently investing 5 units. He may subsequently respond by playing 0 to
keep his initial endowment. Upon observing this, strong players can exploit
the weak player’s behavior by investing only 1 unit to obtain the prize while
also keeping 4 units from the endowment. This may in turn entice the weak
player to move away from investing 0 to win the prize. In contrast, pure
reinforcement-learning (RL) players will respond to these changes in oppo-
nents’ behavior in a much slower manner, because they behave by comparing
received payoffs from past investments without consideration for the strategic
behavior of others (Hopkins, 2002).
Genotyping DNA was extracted from blood samples using QIAamp DNA
Blood Midi Kit (Quiagen). SNP genotyping was performed at the Genome
Institute of Singapore with HumanOmniExpress-12 v1.0 DNA Analysis Kit
(Illumina Inc.). Over 730,000 genetic markers, primarily SNPs, across over
18,000 genes were collected from each subject.
All variable-number tandem repeats (VNTRs) were analyzed with PCR
products loaded onto 1.5% (wt/vol) agarose gel with ethidium bromide, run
for 1 h at 5 V/cm in Tris/borate/EDTA, and visualized in a UV camera.
The DRD4 exon III VNTR was analyzed with HotStar Plus DNA poly-
merase (0.3 U/reaction), 1×Q-solution, 1×CoralLoad buffer (Qiagen), 200
µM of each dNTP, 200 nM of each primer and 10-20 ng of genomic DNA
per reaction, in volume of 10 µL. Primer sequences were as follows: forward
5′- GCGACTACGTGGTCTACTCG -3′, reverse 5′- AGGACCCTCATGGC-
CTTG -3′ (Lichter et al., 1993). Thermal protocol included activation step
at –95°C for 5 min, 40 cycles of 94°C for 30 s, 55°C for 30 s, 72°C for 40 s,
and final hold at 72°C for 5 min.
The monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) VNTR was analyzed with PCR Red-
dyMix Master Mix (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 200 nM of each primer, and
10-20 ng of genomic DNA per reaction, in volume of 10 µL. Primer se-
quences were as follows: forward 5′- ACAGCCTGACCGTGGA-3′, reverse
5′- GAACGGACGCTCCATT-3′ (modified from Sabol et al. (1998)). The
thermal protocol included an activation step at –95°C for 5 min, 35 cycles of
95°C for 30 s, 58°C for 30 s, 72°C for 60 s, and final hold at 72°C for 5 min.
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The dopamine transporter (DAT) VNTR was analyzed with
PCR ReddyMix Master Mix (Thermo Fisher Scientific), 100 nM
of each primer, 0.2% DMSO and 10–20 ng of genomic DNA
per reaction, in volume of 10 µL. Primer sequences were as fol-
lows: forward 5′- TGTGGTGTAGGGAACGGCCTG-3′, reverse 5′-
CTTCCTGGAGGTCACGGCTCA-3′ (modified from Vandenbergh et al.
(1992)). The thermal protocol included an activation step at –95°C for 5
min, 35 cycles of 95°C for 30 s, 61°C for 30 s, 72°C for 30 s; and final hold
at 72°C for 10 min.
Gene Selection and Preprocessing From the dopamine pathway de-
fined in the Kyoto Encyclopedia of Genes and Genomes database, a manu-
ally curated collection of pathway maps widely used in gene-set analysis, we
included dopamine genes that are involved in (i) dopamine synthesis [tyro-
sine hydroxylase (TH), dopa decarboxylase (DDC), and vesicular monoamine
transporter (VMAT)], (ii) coding of dopamine receptors (DRD1–5; DRD5
was excluded from the final analysis owing to limited variation of SNPs in
the sample), and (iii) dopamine transport and clearance [DAT1, catechol-O-
methyl transferase (COMT), and MAOA/B]. For each gene, SNPs were in-
cluded according to hg18 coordinates and had minor allele frequency (MAF)
exceeding 0.1.
SNP extraction and filtering was conducted using PLINK (Purcell et al.,
2007) and snpStats (Solé et al., 2006). For each gene, SNPs were included if
they were contained according to hg18 coordinates and had MAF exceeding
0.1. To reduce dimensionality of the genetic information, we represented each
gene as a linear combination of orthogonal vectors using principle component
analysis (PCA). Specifically, each analyzed gene is represented by a set of
eigenvectors (eigenSNPs) (Wang and Abbott, 2008) from principal compo-
nents accounting for at least 90% of the total variation of that gene’s SNPs.
Occasional genotyping failures (< 3% of all included SNPs had more than 2
out of 217 failures) were coded with the mean value of the SNP.
X-Chromosome Genes Because MAOA/B genes reside on the X-
chromosome, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the interpretation
of allele scores across sex. We addressed this issue in two ways. First, we
estimated the model separating sex. Second, we added a sex interaction
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term to account for multiplicative effects. Both yielded results similar to our
original model.
SI Computational Modeling
Base Experience-Weighted Attraction Model (No Genes) Choice
behavior was modeled using the hybrid model experience-weighted attraction
(EWA) that has been widely used to characterize strategic learning (Camerer
and Ho, 1999). Denote ski as strategy k for player i. Because strategies in the
patent race are investments from either a $5 or $4 endowment, k ∈ {0, . . . , 5}
when player i is strong and k ∈ {0, . . . , 4} when player i is weak. For period
t ∈ {1, . . . , 120}, si(t) is the amount invested by player i at period t, and
s−i(t) is the chosen investment of the opponent at period t.
Player i’s (possibly counterfactual) payoff at period t for some ski , given the
opponent’s actual strategy s−i(t), is equal to the endowment less s
k
i , plus the





Notice that, given s−i(t), this potential payoff differs from player i’s realized
payoff in period t except for when ski = si(t).
Player i’s expected reward, V ki (t), for playing strategy s
k
i in period t is
governed by two parameters and updates according to the following:
V ki (t) =




i , s−i(t))− V ki (t− 1)
]
if ski = si(t)
V ki (t− 1) + 1N(t)
[
δi · πi(ski , s−i(t))− V ki (t− 1)
]
if ski 6= si(t),
(A.1)
(A.2)
where N(t) = ρi · N(t − 1) + 1 captures the depreciation of V ki (t). If the
player believes his opponent is a fast adapter, he will have a small ρ that
depreciates past values faster. In contrast, δ captures the weight between
foregone payoffs and actual payoffs when updating values. This corresponds
to one of the key insights of the hybrid model that belief learning is equivalent
to a model whereby actions are reinforced by foregone payoffs in addition to
received payoffs as in RL models. Thus, δ can be interpreted as a psycholog-
ical inclination toward belief learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999). That is, the
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hybrid model reduces to the RL model when δ = 0 and the belief learning
model when δ = 1.
To more concretely illustrate the effect of belief learning on behavior, we
contrast an EWA strong player with δ1 > 0 with an RL strong player with
δ2 = 0. Suppose our strong player i invests $5 and the opponent invests
$1. Both for EWA and RL the value V 5i will update to take into account
the realized payoff πi(5, 1) = 10. Unlike the RL player, however, the EWA
player with δ1 > 0 will also update values associated with other actions, even
if they were not chosen. For example, in this case the EWA player takes into
account the hypothetical payoff π1(2, 1) = 13 ($10 prize + $3 saved from the
endowment) based on the opponent’s action. Note that as δ1 increases the
greater the sensitivity to the actions of the opponent, ultimately leading to
a higher probability that $2 will be invested in the next round relative to $5.
Gene-Weighted Model To account for gene variation, we allowed δ or ρ
to vary according to the set of eigenSNPs or VNTR dummy variables. For
example, in the case for DAT1 gene, there were three eigenSNPs, and thus
we replace the δ parameter in Equation A.2 with the term
δGi = δ0 + δE1 · E1 + δE2 · E2 + δE3 · E3,
where {Ei1, Ei2, Ei3} refers to i’s three eigenSNP scores and the associated
parameters {δE1, δE2, δE3} refer to the coefficients on the eigenSNPs. The
same procedure is followed for the ρ parameter.
Note that this approach implicitly assumes a linear allele-dose-expression-
response relationship. We relax this assumption in later analyses by allowing
for SNP-SNP interaction.
Behavioral Data Analysis To calibrate the models given subjects’ be-
havior in the game, we estimated parameters of each model, including initial
condition N(0), using subjects’ responses by maximizing the logistic log like-
lihood of the model predictions. To convert values into choices, we used
a logit or softmax function to calculate the probability of player i playing




λ·V li (t), where λ is an
estimated parameter capturing subjects’ sensitivity to differences in expected
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rewards associated with the different actions.
Using choice probabilities calculated from the softmax function, we per-
formed maximum likelihood estimation with a grid search over a large range
of values for all free parameters in all estimations, because the likelihood
function is not globally concave. We aggregated observations conditional
on the roles of the subjects and then fit the choice data by maximizing











. Maximum-likelihood estimation of parameters was
performed using the quasi-Newton algorithm implemented in the fminunc
function in Matlab. Approximately 100 random or evenly spaced interior
starting values were tried, all of which produced essentially identical esti-
mates.
Individual SNP Analysis We compare our gene-set methodology to
other candidate gene approaches by analyzing a selection of individual SNPs
for each of the significant genes. These SNPs were identified by cross-
referencing the genetic markers available to us with the tagging SNPs sug-
gested by the International HapMap Project’s Generic Genome Browser (In-
ternational HapMap Consortium et al., 2003). Appropriate tagging SNPs
were determined based on pairwise correlations (Bakker et al., 2005). For
reference data, we used Han Chinese in Beijing in Data Rel 27 Phase II+III,
Feb 09, on NCBI B36 assembly, dbSNP b126. R2 and MAF cutoffs were 0.8
and 0.1, respectively.
SNP–SNP Interactions To account for SNP–SNP interactions, we ex-
tended the eigenSNP approach by performing PCA on the set of regressors
produced from a third-order interaction of the underlying SNP data. For
example, if a gene contained 4 SNPs, we performed PCA on the set of 84
regressors, resulting from 4 original SNPs, an additional 16 second-order in-
teraction terms, and a further additional 64 third-order interaction terms.
Using the same procedure as outlined above, we took the set of eigenSNPs
that explained at least 90% of the variance and included them in our com-
putational model.
Permutation P Values Under the permutation test null hypothesis, in-
dividuals are interchangeable, so label-swapping provides a new dataset sam-
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pled under the null hypothesis. In each permutation, therefore, the within-
gene correlations are preserved and only the behavior–genotype relation is
destroyed (Purcell et al., 2007). For each gene, data were permutated 1,000
times by shuffling the gene–subject pairing. The reported P value is equal
to the proportion of tests where model fit of the permuted dataset
Empirical P Values Empirical P values were determined by comparing
model fit of the gene within the dopamine pathway to comparison genes
across the entire genome but outside of the dopamine pathway. A gene
was considered comparable if (i) it was represented by the same or similar
number of SNPs and (ii) these SNPs generated the same number of principal
components according to the procedure outlined above. A range of SNPs
was allowed in cases where an exact match produced too few genes (Table
A.1). This typically occurred when there were a large number of SNPs in
the gene.
Formal Dissociation Test To formally compare effect size of prefrontal
and striatal dopamine genes on choice behavior, we contrasted, using a boot-
strap procedure, the mean eigenSNP coefficients for COMT and MAOB
against those for DAT1 and DRD2 (Davison and Hinkley, 1997). Specifi-
cally, for each of 1,000 iterations of the bootstrap we created a pseudosample
by sampling with replacement behavioral and genetic data from 218 par-
ticipants, and performed maximum likelihood estimates as described above.
The resulting coefficients were standardized to ensure comparability across
eigenSNPs, and the reported P value is equal to the proportion of tests where
the mean coefficient for one gene set was greater than that of the other gene
set.
SI Results
Predictive Accuracy of EWA Model To assess the ability of our model
to capture choice behavior in the patent race, we compared actual proportion
of investment against predicted investment proportion (Fig. A.1A). This is
equivalent to a scatterplot of the empirical and EWA prediction proportions
as reported in Table A.2. Each point represents an investment strategy,
that is, strong investment of 5, separately for strong and weak roles. The
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predicted investment proportion was computed by averaging the round-by-
round predictions of the baseline EWA model, aggregating all players over all
120 rounds. The dashed diagonal line represents perfect agreement between
the model predictions and actual play. As evident from how closely each point
lies to this line, model prediction and actual play are in good agreement, with
a χ2 test result of P< 10−8 and a mean difference of less than 5%.
In addition, we sought to incorporate visualization of game dynamics by
separating predictions into 30-round blocks, with blocks in the same sequence
connected in a series (Fig. A.1B). All points lie near the diagonal line,
confirming the success of the hybrid model of capturing actual play at the
finer temporal resolution. The successful modeling of the relative dynamics
is also apparent in the generally diagonal pattern within each sequence of
points. Although aggregating over rounds and subjects understates the full
range of behavior, these plots make clear that the hybrid learning model
performs well overall, including the capturing of movements where static
approaches are not able to capture.
Note that we do not report a statistic such as R2 because of the discrete
nature of our dependent variable. This issue, as well as model checking
techniques such as the one we report above, has been discussed in depth in
both neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies of decision making (Sugrue
et al., 2005).
Incorporating SNP–SNP Interactions Owing to the low explanatory
power of single SNPs, a frequent proposal is that there exists substantial
variation that can be explained by accounting for SNP–SNP interactions
(Yacubian et al., 2007). Accordingly, we investigated this question using
our gene-set approach by conducting PCA on regressors formed using third-
order interactions of SNPs within a gene. Using the same 90% cutoff rule, we
found that incorporating SNP–SNP interactions improved model fit of genes
that were previously significant, in particular COMT and DRD2 (Table A.4).
Interestingly, we did not find qualitative changes in overall level of significance
of dopamine genes after accounting for SNP–SNP interactions.
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(2007) “Gene–Gene Interaction Associated with Neural Reward Sensitiv-
ity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, No. 19,
pp. 8125–8130.
108
Figure A.1: (A) Predicted and actual investment proportions for strong and
weak players, averaged over all subjects for all rounds. Each point
represents an investment amount (weak, 0–4; strong: 0–5). (B) Identical to












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Supporting material for Chapter 4: Collusion
This section collects some analyses that may be of interest that are too
burdensome for the main text, as well as the specific text descriptions used
in the experiment.
Social preferences
Social preference measures were computed according to how subjects ranked
three allocations, (Me, Y ou) = (5, 5), (8, 2), or (5, 7), in the modified dictator
game. If the most-preferred allocation was (5,5), then FairS = 2, and if second
most-preferred, FairS = 1, otherwise FairS = 0. Similarly for the more selfish
allocation, (8,2), and the social welfare maximizing allocation, (5,7). These
measures are perfectly collinear by design and, in practice, correlated.
Table B.1: Correlation between social preference measures
FairS SWMS SelfS
FairS 1 -0.376 -0.722
SWMS -0.376 1 -0.369
SelfS -0.722 -0.369 1
Rejecting collusion
Some subjects gave false reports other than six, intentionally forgoing any
benefits. The proportion of subjects who did this increased significantly
when one outsider bears a large cost of collusion. Although a relatively
small proportion of subjects engaged in these “moral lies,” my analysis (Ta-
ble B.2) suggests that these responses were not simply due to cognitive de-
cline, as older subjects were less likely to report numbers other than six.
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Interestingly, politically conservative respondents were more sensitive to the
concentrated losses in IIC (LossDirect), though religiosity, which was gener-
ally correlated with conservatism on political and economic issues, was not
predictive (p > 0.5, not shown). Besides the direct interpretation, another
reasonable explanation is that conservatism correlates with income among
American Mechanical Turk users, and this influences subject willingness to
collude when losses are concentrated on a few.
Social preferences were not predictive at all, either in the overall level, or
specifically in the IIC treatment (best-fit shown). This is consistent with the
idea that other-regarding players are generally choosing based on the status-
quo or social norms, rather than enacting a specific moral calculus, though
the limited number of moral lies and the dangers of overfitting should be
kept in mind.
Task material
The experiment was conducted by soliciting US-based Mechanical Turk work-
ers to complete the following survey, implemented in and hosted by Qualtrics.
The survey flow was as follows: consent (not included), instructions, one
treatment scenario, modified dictator game, and demographic questionnaire.
Scenarios were counterbalanced, though some differences in the total numbers
for each scenario arose from would-be participants starting the task but not
finishing/submitting.
Instructions
Sometimes, people may be tempted to misreport information,
such as when filing their tax returns. In this study, you will
be presented with a scenario in which someone might want to
misreport information. Please answer the questions as best and
as honestly as you can.
Click the button below to begin. You will be given a scenario,
followed by a couple simple questions, which should take about








































































































































































































































































Treatment scenarios Scenario II: Collude
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
two people earn depends on their roll of the dice.
Specifically, each person rolls a die, one after the other. If
together they roll a double (where both dice yield the same num-
ber), then an award of ten times the type of double is given to
each, from $10 each for a pair of ones to $60 each for a pair of
sixes. If the dice do not yield a double, then no money is awarded.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result. The first person announces their result before the second
person rolls.
Suppose the first person reports rolling a six. If you are the
second person, what number would you report?
 The truth (low chance of getting $60)
 One (both of you get nothing)
 Two (both of you get nothing)
 Three (both of you get nothing)
 Four (both of you get nothing)
 Five (both of you get nothing)
 Six (both of you get $60)
Suppose instead that you are the first person to roll. What
number would you report?
 The truth
 One (both possibly get $10)
 Two (both possibly get $20)
 Three (both possibly get $30)
 Four (both possibly get $40)
 Five (both possibly get $50)
 Six (both possibly get $60)
Scenario IID: Diffuse Loss
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Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
102 people earn depends on a roll of the dice.
Specifically, two people roll one die each, one after the other;
the other 100 people do not need to roll. If together they roll a
double (where both dice yield the same number), then an award
of ten times the type of double is given to each die roller, from
$10 each for a pair of ones to $60 each for a pair of sixes. The
other people lose 1/100th that same amount, so $0.60 for a pair of
sixes. If the dice do not yield a double, then no money is awarded
or lost.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result.
Suppose the first person reports rolling a six. If you are the
second person, what number would you report?
 The truth (low chance of getting $60)
 One (two of you get nothing, and 100 people lose nothing)
 Two (two of you get nothing, and 100 people lose nothing)
 Three (two of you get nothing, and 100 people lose nothing)
 Four (two of you get nothing, and 100 people lose nothing)
 Five (two of you get nothing, and 100 people lose nothing)
 Six (two of you get $60, and 100 people lose $0.60)
Suppose instead you are the first person to roll. What number
would you report?
 The truth
 One (two of you possibly get $10, and 100 people possibly
lose $0.10)
 Two (two of you possibly get $20, and 100 people possibly
lose $0.20)
 Three (two of you possibly get $30, and 100 people possibly
lose $0.30)
 Four (two of you possibly get $40, and 100 people possibly
lose $0.40)
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 Five (two of you possibly get $50, and 100 people possibly
lose $0.50)
 Six (two of you possibly get $60, and 100 people possibly
lose $0.60)
Scenario IIC: Concentrated Loss
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
three people earn depends on a roll of the dice.
Specifically, two people roll one die each, one after the other;
the third person does not need to roll. If together they roll a
double (where both dice yield the same number), then an award
of ten times the type of double is given to each die roller, from
$10 each for a pair of ones to $60 each for a pair of sixes. The
third person loses that same amount. If the dice do not yield a
double, then no money is awarded or lost.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result.
Suppose the first person reports rolling a six. If you are the
second person, what number would you report?
 The truth (low chance of getting $60)
 One (two of you get nothing, and third person loses nothing)
 Two (two of you get nothing, and third person loses nothing)
 Three (two of you get nothing, and third person loses noth-
ing)
 Four (two of you get nothing, and third person loses nothing)
 Five (two of you get nothing, and third person loses nothing)
 Six (two of you get $60, and the third person loses $60)
Suppose instead you are the first person to roll. What number
would you report?
 The truth
 One (two of you possibly get $10, and the third person pos-
sibly loses $10)
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 Two (two of you possibly get $20, and the third person pos-
sibly loses $20)
 Three (two of you possibly get $30, and the third person
possibly loses $30)
 Four (two of you possibly get $40, and the third person
possibly loses $40)
 Five (two of you possibly get $50, and the third person pos-
sibly loses $50)
 Six (two of you possibly get $60, and the third person pos-
sibly loses $60)
Scenario III: Contagion
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
three people earn depends on their roll of the dice.
Specifically, each person rolls a die, one after the other. If
together they roll a three-of-a-kind (where three dice yield the
same number), then an award of ten times the type of pair is
given to each, from $10 each for three ones to $60 each for three
sixes. If the dice do not yield a three-of-a-kind, then no money is
awarded.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result. The first person announces their result before the second
person rolls, and so on.
Suppose the first person reports rolling a six, followed by the
second person also reporting a six. If you are the third person,
what number would you report?
 The truth (low chance of getting $60)
 One (all three of you get nothing)
 Two (all three of you get nothing)
 Three (all three of you get nothing)
 Four (all three of you get nothing)
 Five (all three of you get nothing)
 Six (all three of you get $60)
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Suppose instead that you are the first person to roll. What
number would you report?
 The truth
 One (all possibly get $10)
 Two (all possibly get $20)
 Three (all possibly get $30)
 Four (all possibly get $40)
 Five (all possibly get $50)
 Six (all possibly get $60)
Scenario IIG: Contagion Control
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
three people earn depends on a roll of the dice.
Specifically, two people roll one die each, one after the other;
the third person does not need to roll. If together they roll a
double (where both dice yield the same number), then an award
of ten times the type of double is given to each person, from $10
each for a pair of ones to $60 each for a pair of sixes. If the dice
do not yield a double, then no money is awarded or lost.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result. Suppose the first person reports rolling a six.
If you are the second person, what number would you report?
 The truth (low chance of getting $60)
 One (all three of you get nothing)
 Two (all three of you get nothing)
 Three (all three of you get nothing)
 Four (all three of you get nothing)
 Five (all three of you get nothing)
 Six (all three of you get $60)
Suppose instead that you are the first person to roll. What
number would you report?
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 The truth
 One (all possibly get $10)
 Two (all possibly get $20)
 Three (all possibly get $30)
 Four (all possibly get $40)
 Five (all possibly get $50)
 Six (all possibly get $60)
Scenario Solo: Individual
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
someone earns depends on their roll of the dice.
Specifically, two dice are rolled. If they roll a double (where
both dice yield the same number), then an amount of ten times
the type of double is given, from $10 for a pair of ones to $60 for
a pair of sixes. If the dice do not yield a double, then no money
is awarded.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result.
What would you report (choose from the options below)?
 The truth (low chance of getting money)
 A pair of 1s (get $10)
 A pair of 2s (get $20)
 A pair of 3s (get $30)
 A pair of 4s (get $40)
 A pair of 5s (get $50)
 A pair of 6s (get $60)
Scenario SoloG: Individual with Passive Beneficiary
Consider a simple situation in which the amount of money
two people earn depends on a roll of the dice.
Specifically, one person rolls two dice are rolled; the other
person does not need to roll. If they roll a double (where both
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dice yield the same number), then an amount of ten times the
type of double is given to each person, from $10 each for a pair
of ones to $60 each for a pair of sixes. If the dice do not yield a
double, then no money is awarded.
Die rolling is private, so that the true outcome is known to no
one other than the die roller, who publicly announces their own
result.
What would you report (choose from the options below)?
 The truth (low chance of getting money)
 A pair of 1s (both get $10)
 A pair of 2s (both get $20)
 A pair of 3s (both get $30)
 A pair of 4s (both get $40)
 A pair of 5s (both get $50)
 A pair of 6s (both get $60)
Modified Dictator Game
Suppose that you can decide how to divide some money be-
tween you and some other anonymous person that you will never
meet (i.e. another MTurk worker). You may imagine that they,
like you, have agreed to participate in this survey, but by chance
are not making this choice.
Please rank the following allocations from your most preferred
(1) to your least preferred (3). Drag and drop the options to
rearrange them.
 You get $5 and they get $7
 You get $8 and they get $2
 You get $5 and they get $5
Demographic information
1. Are you a native English speaker? (Yes/No)
2. What is your age?
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3. What is your gender? (Male/Female)
4. How politically liberal or conservative are you?
 SOCIAL ISSUES (7-point scale)
 ECONOMIC ISSUES (7-point scale)
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